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Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts “in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States.”1  How should a proponent of an “origi-
nal public meaning” approach to statutory interpretation go about determin-
ing whether a challenged agreement is, in fact, “in restraint of trade”?  The
most straightforward approach, it would seem, would be to read “in restraint
of trade” as a common-law term of art invoking a rich body of contract law,
generated largely by state courts, in place in 1890 when Congress passed the
Act.  This body of law defined with some precision the types of contracts that
courts declined to enforce.  By employing this term, it might be said, Con-
gress presumably invoked that body of law and compelled federal courts to
ban those restraints, but only those restraints, that common-law courts would
have declined to enforce in 1890.  Conceptually, then, judicial enforcement
of the Sherman Act could be a straightforward exercise in legal research,
familiar in some respects to the approach that originalists have taken in other
statutory contexts.2
But Justice Scalia took a different approach to the Sherman Act.  Most
notably, in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., the Justice
rejected the claim that the Sherman Act simply banned a fixed list of agree-
ments deemed unenforceable in 1890.3  Instead, he said, section 1 of the Act
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1 Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(2012)).
2 Cf. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 121–26 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(invoking pre-statutory interpretations of a statutory term of art as establishing the mean-
ing of the contested term); see also infra notes 86–101 and accompanying text (discussing
other examples).
3 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988).
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bans agreements that produce a “particular economic consequence.”4  That
consequence was the exercise of market power to the detriment of consum-
ers.5  Moreover, he said, both the actual and perceived impact of identical
agreements can differ “in varying times and circumstances.”6  Thus agree-
ments deemed “in restraint of trade” (by common-law courts) and thus con-
trary to the Sherman Act in 1890 can become perfectly lawful in 1990,
despite the lack of any intervening change in the statutory text.  Under this
approach, adjudication under the Sherman Act is less an exercise in histori-
cal research than an opportunity for microeconomic analysis, drawing upon
recent law review articles instead of nineteenth-century state reports.  Indeed,
the account of the meaning of the Sherman Act sketched and applied in
Business Electronics replicated that advocated by leading members of the Chi-
cago School of antitrust analysis, particularly Robert Bork and Frank Easter-
brook.  Both jurists, and the Chicago School in general, have read the
Sherman Act to articulate a standard, “consumer welfare,” delegating to
courts authority to employ economic analysis to determine whether a chal-
lenged agreement reduces such welfare and thus violates the Sherman Act.
Some scholars claim that Justice Scalia’s Chicago-style antitrust jurispru-
dence contradicted his professed commitment to reading statutes according
to their original public meaning.  At least as practiced by the Justice, they say,
an original public meaning approach would require courts to treat the term
“in restraint of trade” as invoking a set of fixed common-law rules, not the
sort of economic standard the Justice endorsed in Business Electronics.  These
rules, they say, did not reflect concern for consumer welfare but instead val-
ues such as fairness and individual autonomy and thus often diverged from
the result that application of an economic standard would produce.  These
same scholars contend that the original public meaning approach necessarily
precludes the sort of dynamic approach Justice Scalia endorsed in Business
Electronics.  That is, despite section 1’s invocation of the common law, judges
generating section 1 jurisprudence must ignore advances in economic the-
ory, even if such advances entirely undermine the economic premises of par-
ticular common-law rules.  Indeed, some such scholars contend that Justice
Scalia’s approach to section 1 exemplifies the approach that jurists take to so-
called “super statutes” as opposed to mere “ordinary legislation” and thus
departs from his professed method of statutory interpretation.
This Essay offers a defense of Justice Scalia’s approach to the Sherman
Act.  For one thing, the approach broke little new ground, either in general
or as applied in cases such as Business Electronics.  Instead, such an approach
was a faithful implementation of Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States,
which announced section 1’s “Rule of Reason.”7  After its own lengthy exege-
sis of the common law, Standard Oil announced that the term “restraint of
4 Id. at 731.
5 See infra notes 48–50 and accompanying text (explaining that Business Electronics
treated such an exercise of market power as the sole cognizable antitrust harm).
6 Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 731.
7 221 U.S. 1, 61–62 (1911).
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trade” does not refer to a set of fixed rules, but instead directs courts to apply
a “standard of reason” when evaluating challenged restraints.8  That is, courts
should ask whether a challenged agreement produces monopoly or the con-
sequences of monopoly, namely, higher prices, reduced output, and/or
reduced quality.  A broader reading, the Court said, would ban contracts and
combinations protected by liberty of contract.9  Moreover, in making this
assessment, Standard Oil said, courts should recognize that “economic con-
ceptions” change over time, and apply the latest conception when evaluating
the impact of a restraint.10
Of course, Justice Scalia was sometimes willing to abandon longstanding
precedent if he believed that that precedent deviated significantly from a
correct reading of the relevant legal text.  Thus, stare decisis is not a categori-
cal defense to claims that the Justice deviated from his stated approach to
interpretation in the Sherman Act context.  This Essay therefore attempts to
test various scholars’ claims that an original public meaning approach to the
Sherman Act produces statutory meaning different from that announced in
Business Electronics and, for that matter, Standard Oil.  The Essay rejects the
Supreme Court’s apparent claim that the absurdity canon supports Standard
Oil’s reading of section 1, as the statutory text does not satisfy Justice Scalia’s
standard for declaring a term “absurd.”  Nor would most modern proponents
of original meaning embrace Standard Oil’s invocation of liberty of contract
as a rationale for reading the statute narrowly.
This leaves the common law as the last possible support for Standard
Oil’s Rule of Reason.  Modern scholars, as already noted, (implicitly) claim
that Standard Oil misread the common law, mistakenly imputing to that juris-
prudence a purely economic standard.  However, evaluation of the claim that
Business Electronics takes a nontextual approach does not require us to adjudi-
cate this dispute about the meaning of the common law.  As this Essay shows,
the common law was not the only body of law relevant to the meaning of the
term “restraint of trade or commerce” when Congress passed the Sherman
Act in 1890.  Instead, the term “restraint of . . . commerce among the several
states” appeared several times in the Court’s Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence during the 1880s.11  That is, the Court employed this term as a syno-
nym for (state) “regulation” of commerce among the several states,
regulation that Congress had implicitly preempted according to what we now
call the Court’s “dormant Commerce Clause” jurisprudence.  According to
that well-developed body of law, a state statute was such a restraint or regula-
tion of commerce among the several states if it “directly” burdened or
“directly obstructed” interstate commerce.  Regulations that imposed so-
called “indirect restraints” of such commerce, by contrast, fell within states’
exclusive authority to impose.  By enforcing this distinction, the Court cre-
ated a regime of free trade among the states, thereby preventing states from
8 Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
9 See id.
10 Id. at 55.
11 See infra Part I.
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interfering with the competitive allocation of resources and exploiting
consumers.
The Court’s pre-Sherman Act Commerce Clause jurisprudence and its
distinction between direct and indirect restraints provides a potent source of
meaning for the term “restraint of trade or commerce.”  Congress, of course,
possessed no general authority to generate a common law governing private
contracts in 1890.  Instead, the Sherman Act was, on its face, an exercise of
the power to regulate “[c]ommerce . . . among the several States,”12 a power
that consisted of the authority to preempt “regulations” or “restraints” of
interstate commerce.  The Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence, which defined that category of state-imposed restraints that Congress
had implicitly preempted, therefore provided a ready definition of the term
“restraint of trade or commerce among the several states,” and a definition
that implements the then-extant limits on congressional power.  That is, the
term “restraint of trade or commerce” could refer to those contracts or
agreements that “directly” obstruct or burden trade and thus, like analogous
state statutes, impermissibly regulate commerce and fall within Congress’s
authority for that reason.  This definition, of course, would exclude so-called
“indirect” burdens or obstructions from the reach of the Act, leaving such
agreements exclusively within the jurisdiction of the states, even if such
agreements were otherwise unenforceable according to the common law of
1890.
Of course, identification of one possible source of meaning does not
thereby exclude other possibilities.  Instead, such identification merely
requires the interpreter to choose between the competing sources identified.
Such a choice is relatively straightforward in this context, however.  After all,
the “direct/indirect” taxonomy was not merely linguistic.  It also communi-
cated a distinction of constitutional dimension, denying Congress authority
over agreements that merely restrained trade indirectly.  Beginning with this
premise, reading the Act to invoke the common law of contracts would be
awkward at best.  At worst, reading the Act to incorporate the common law of
contracts, even those connected in one way or another to interstate com-
merce, is an anachronism, as Congress would have no authority over those
agreements that restrained commerce “indirectly.”  Thus, reading the term
“contract[s] . . . in restraint of trade” to codify the common law of contracts
would purport to ban entire categories of agreement over which Congress
possessed no authority in the first place.
The Supreme Court took just this approach in no fewer than five early
decisions interpreting the Act during the 1890s.13  While some have claimed
that the Court invoked the common law, the Justices in fact read the direct/
indirect distinction into the Act, expressly holding that section 1 only bans
12 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
13 See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); Hopkins v.
United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505
(1898); United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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restraints that “direct[ly] and immediate[ly]” regulate, and thus restrain
trade or commerce among the several states.14  Moreover, when deciding
whether a restraint was direct or indirect, the Court employed a standards-
like approach, examining the nature of the industry and the economic pur-
poses of the restraint.15
I. SECTION 1’S EVOLVING RULE OF REASON
Passed in 1890, section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “contract[s],
combination[s] . . . or conspirac[ies], in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States.”16  Section 2 prohibits “monopoliz[ation]” of “any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States.”17  During the Act’s
first two decades, the Supreme Court read the Act in an apparently formalis-
tic fashion, holding that the Act prohibited only “direct” restraints of inter-
state commerce, while leaving so-called “indirect” restraints unscathed.18  In
1911, however, the Court shifted course, at least rhetorically.  In Standard Oil
Co. of New Jersey v. United States, the Court embarked upon a lengthy exegesis
of the history of judicial and legislative treatment of trade restraints.19  This
history, the Court said, established that Congress meant courts to employ
“the standard of reason” when determining whether an agreement is “in
restraint of trade” within the meaning of the Act.20  Application of the statute
to “every case within its literal language,” the Court said, “would be destruc-
tive of all right to contract or agree or combine in any respect whatever as to
subjects embraced in interstate trade or commerce.”21  By giving the statute a
“reasonable construction,” then, the Court avoided applications of the stat-
14 See, e.g., Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. at 234; Hopkins, 171 U.S. at 592; see also
infra notes 162–68 and accompanying text (collecting and discussing additional citations).
15 See infra notes 169–79 and accompanying text.
16 Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(2012)).
17 Sherman Act § 2, 26 Stat. at 209.
18 See Hopkins, 171 U.S. at 581, 594 (holding that the Act did not ban rules promul-
gated by a cattleman’s association because such restraints were “indirect”); Joint Traffic
Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (holding that the Act prohibited horizontal price fixing between inter-
state railroads that had received special benefits and privileges from various states); id. at
568–69 (opining that the Act did not prohibit so-called “indirect” restraints of interstate
commerce); E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 16–17 (holding that a merger creating a national
sugar monopoly was merely an indirect restraint and thus beyond the scope of the Act).
19 221 U.S. 1, 49–62 (1911).
20 Id. at 60 (“Thus not specifying but indubitably contemplating and requiring a stan-
dard, it follows that it was intended that the standard of reason which had been applied at
the common law and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by
the statute, was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether
in a given case a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which the
statute provided.”); id. at 64 (referring to the statute as “clearly fixing a standard”).
21 Id. at 63; see also United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911)
(“[Standard Oil held] that the duty to interpret which inevitably arose from the general
character of the term restraint of trade required that the words restraint of trade should be
given a meaning which would not destroy the individual right to contract and render diffi-
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ute that would infringe upon liberty of contract, which the Court had recog-
nized in then-recent decisions such as Lochner v. New York22 and Adair v.
United States.23
Such a “Rule of Reason,” of course, requires courts to determine the
content of the “standard of reason” to be applied. Standard Oil itself sug-
gested that the common law’s Rule of Reason required courts to ask whether
a restraint produces “monopoly” or “the consequences of monopoly,” which
the Court defined as higher prices, reduced output, or lower quality.24  The
Court also endorsed a flexible approach to ascertaining the economic impact
of restraints and thus their status under the Rule of Reason, discussing with
approval common-law decisions that had refashioned doctrine in light of
“more accurate economic conceptions.”25  In the end, the Court said, the
Rule of Reason required judges to employ “the light of reason” to determine
whether a challenged agreement offended the “public policy embodied in
the statute,” a process that, while applying a fixed normative standard, could
produce different doctrinal results as “economic conceptions” evolved over
time.26
cult if not impossible any movement of trade in the channels of interstate commerce—the
free movement of which it was the purpose of the statute to protect.”).
22 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
23 208 U.S. 161 (1908); see also RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA,
1888–1992: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 58 (1996) (“Standard Oil . . . can be understood as
closing Lochner’s circle of individual liberty.”); Alan J. Meese, Standard Oil as Lochner’s
Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 787–801 (2012) (explaining that Standard Oil’s Rule of
Reason implemented Lochner-like protection for liberty of contract).
24 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 56–57 (explaining the development of common law equat-
ing “restraint of trade” with “contracts or acts which it was considered had a monopolistic
tendency, especially those which were thought to unduly diminish competition and hence
to enhance prices—in other words, to monopolize”); id. at 61 (referring to “the previous
history of the law of restraint of trade to which we have referred and the indication which it
gives of the practical evolution by which monopoly and the acts which produce the same
result as monopoly, that is, an undue restraint of the course of trade, all came to be spoken
of as, and to be indeed synonymous with, restraint of trade”); id. at 52 (describing conse-
quences of monopoly as: “1. The power which the monopoly gave to the one who enjoyed
it to fix the price and thereby injure the public; 2. The power which it engendered of
enabling a limitation on production; and, 3. The danger of deterioration in quality of the
monopolized article which it was deemed was the inevitable resultant of the monopolistic
control over its production and sale”); see also Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and
the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 77, 83–89 (describing Standard Oil’s focus on price,
output, and quality). See generally Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept:
Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 801–05 (1965) (discussing Standard Oil’s
Rule of Reason).
25 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55, 58; see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 69 (4th ed. 2011) (explaining that pre-
Sherman Act common law reflected “rules of classical political economy concerning the
nature of competition and the efficiency consequences of various anticompetitive
practices”).
26 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 64; see also id. at 58–60 (discussing with approval American
common law and legislation that “depend[ed] . . . upon the economic conceptions which
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Subsequently the Court changed course, however, suggesting at various
times during the twentieth century that courts should include certain
noneconomic considerations, such as autonomy and fairness, in the “stan-
dard of reason” as well.27  This normative shift, combined with economic the-
ory suspicious of departures from atomistic competition, produced the so-
called “inhospitality tradition” of antitrust, pursuant to which courts con-
demned numerous nonstandard agreements that produced no harm and
often produced significant benefits.28  While nominally applications of Stan-
dard Oil’s Rule of Reason,29 these decisions substituted an entirely different
criterion of reasonableness, condemning many agreements simply because
they restricted rivalry and departed from atomistic competition.30
The Chicago School began to challenge this interventionist orthodoxy
in the 1950s.  This challenge had three components: normative, scientific,
and jurisprudential.  As a normative matter, Chicagoans expressed a prefer-
obtained at the time when the legislation was adopted or judicial decision was rendered”
with the result that “contracts or acts were at one time deemed to be of such a character as
to justify the inference of wrongful intent which were at another period thought not to be
of that character”).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606–08 (1972) (banning
ancillary horizontal restraints between modest market participants despite finding that
such restraints produced no harm and improved interbrand competition); id. at 610 (hold-
ing that the Sherman Act is the “Magna Carta of free enterprise”); Albrecht v. Herald Co.,
390 U.S. 145, 151–53 (1968) (banning maximum resale price maintenance as unlawful per
se despite the practice’s tendency to reduce consumer prices because, inter alia, the prac-
tice interfered with the “freedom of traders”), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3
(1997); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 210, 214 (1959) (rejecting
the lower court’s holding that impact on price, output, or quality was a sine qua non of a
section 1 violation); id. at 213 (declaring a group boycott unlawful per se because it inter-
fered with the plaintiff’s “freedom to buy appliances in an open competitive market and
[drove] it out of business as a dealer in the defendants’ products”); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239–41 (1918) (announcing a multifactor rule of reason test
requiring courts to consider, inter alia, the impact of the challenged restraint on the length
of the work day for the parties that imposed the restraint).
28 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There A Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV. 705,
715 (1982) (describing the so-called “inhospitality tradition” of antitrust, whereby
“courts . . . str[uck] down business practices that were not clearly procompetitive.  In this
tradition an inference of monopolization followed from the courts’ inability to grasp how a
practice might be consistent with substantial competition.  The tradition took hold when
many practices were genuine mysteries to economists, and monopolistic explanations of
mysteries were congenial.  The same tradition emphasized competition in the spot mar-
ket.”); Meese, supra note 24, at 124 n.245 (describing the origin of the term “inhospitality
tradition”).
29 See, e.g., Klor’s, Inc., 359 U.S. at 211 (invoking Standard Oil with approval as a
“landmark case” and purporting to apply it).
30 See, e.g., id. at 210 (finding a practice unlawful per se despite the absence of any
allegation that the contract impacted “the price, quantity, or quality offered the public . . .
[or] that there was any intent or purpose to effect a change in, or an influence on, prices,
quantity, or quality” (quoting Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 255 F.2d 214, 230
(9th Cir. 1958))).
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ence for wealth maximization as the exclusive goal of antitrust regulation.31
As a scientific matter, Chicago critiqued numerous economic assumptions
that drove inhospitality caselaw, assumptions that produced hostility toward
nonstandard contracts, that is, agreements that departed from atomistic com-
petition.32  Finally, as a jurisprudential matter, Chicagoans claimed that the
Sherman Act itself required courts to implement Chicago’s preferred norma-
tive standard,33 and also authorized courts to adjust antitrust doctrine over
time in response to changes in economic theory.34  Most famously, of course,
Robert Bork argued that the legislative history of the Sherman Act estab-
lished that Congress meant to ban only those restraints that reduced “con-
sumer welfare,” which Bork equated with “consumer want satisfaction” or
total welfare.35  Among other things, Bork contended that congressional
debates articulated and endorsed a fictitious version of the common law con-
31 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(1978).  As I have explained elsewhere, the so-called Harvard School of antitrust analysis
embraced the same “total welfare” normative premise derived from neoclassical econom-
ics, beginning in the 1950s. See Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We
Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659 (2010).  However, the Harvard School’s reliance upon
neoclassical price theory to interpret the impact of various nonstandard agreements led it
to condemn numerous agreements that economists now interpret as beneficial or benign.
See, e.g., Meese, supra note 24, at 122–23 (describing such reliance on price theory by
leading members of the Harvard School during the 1950s and 1960s).
32 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 31, at 365–81 (tying); Bork, supra note 24; Frank H. Eas-
terbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135 (1984); Victor
P. Goldberg, The Law and Economics of Vertical Restrictions: A Relational Perspective, 58 TEX. L.
REV. 91 (1979); Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1982); Lester G.
Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960); see also Alan J.
Meese, Robert Bork’s Forgotten Role in the Transaction Cost Revolution, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 953
(2014).
33 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 31, at 72–73; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 212–17 (1976); Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the
Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966) (contending that the Sherman Act bans only those
restraints that reduce overall “consumer welfare” or “consumer want satisfaction”).
34 See, e.g., Bork, supra note 33, at 48 (“Courts charged by Congress with the maximiza-
tion of consumer welfare are free to revise not only prior judge-made rules but, it would
seem, rules contemplated by Congress.  The Sherman Act defines the class of situations to
which it may be applied, but it does not freeze into statutory commands the rules of legality
about predation, mergers, and so forth, that many congressmen contemplated.  Sherman
and others clearly believed that they were legislating a policy and delegating to the courts
the elaboration of subsidiary rules.  Nothing in the legislative history or in the language of
the statute suggests that courts are required to hold any specific type of agreement or
behavior unlawful regardless of its probable impact upon consumers.  In terms of the ‘law,’
therefore, the Sherman Act tells judges very little.  A judge who feels compelled to a partic-
ular result regardless of the teachings of economic theory deceives himself and abdicates
his delegated responsibility.  That responsibility is nothing less than the awesome task of
continually creating and recreating the Sherman Act out of his understanding of econom-
ics and his conception of the requirements of the judicial process.”).
35 Id. at 7 (“[T]he policy the courts were intended to apply is the maximization of
wealth or consumer want satisfaction.”).
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cerned solely with consumer welfare as Bork defined it.36  Courts implement-
ing this command, he said, should not feel bound by “prior judge-made
rules” or even “rules contemplated by Congress.”37  Instead, he said, courts
should accept “the awesome task of continually creating and recreating the
Sherman Act out of [their] understanding of economics and [their] concep-
tion of the requirements of the judicial process.”38  Other Chicagoans
expressed their agreement with Bork’s assessment of the meaning of the
Sherman Act as well as Bork’s contention that the Act authorized courts to
adjust antitrust doctrine in light of modern economic theory.39
The Chicago School has won the day with respect to most antitrust ques-
tions.  While some have characterized this victory as a triumph of economics
or ideology over law, Chicago seems simply to have resurrected Standard Oil’s
version of the Rule of Reason, with its exclusive emphasis on the economic
effects of challenged restraints and its admonition that courts ascertain those
effects “in the light of reason” sensitive to changed economic conceptions.40
Indeed, even before his famous examination of the Sherman Act’s legislative
history, Robert Bork concluded that Standard Oil articulated a Rule of Reason
containing a “dynamic principle” and focused on banning restraints that pro-
duced monopoly or the consequences thereof.41
36 See id. at 36–37 (“Sherman and the others also repeatedly stated what the common
law was.  The fact that their statements did not accurately mirror that confused body of
precedent does not obscure what they intended to convey.  It is clear from the debates that
‘the common law’ relevant to the Sherman Act is an artificial construct, made up for the
occasion out of a careful selection of recent decisions from a variety of jurisdictions plus a
liberal admixture of the senators’ own policy prescriptions.  It is to this ‘common law,’
holding full sway nowhere but in the debates of the Fifty-first Congress, that one must look
to understand the Sherman Act.”); see also id. at 36 (“The common law of restraints of
trade . . . has been a variable growth, composed of diverse and even contradictory strains,
many of them obviously irrelevant to the concerns of the Sherman Act.”); Robert H. Bork,
Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act, 15 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC. 211, 212–14 (1959) (con-
tending that the common law enforced some ancillary restraints that restricted rivalry with
no offsetting benefits and thus harmed consumers).
37 Bork, supra note 33, at 48.
38 Id.
39 See, e.g., Easterbook, supra note 28, at 706 (“The Sherman and Clayton Acts author-
ized the Supreme Court to invent and enforce a law of restraint of trade in the common
law fashion.  The Court has consistently drawn on the common law tradition.  The com-
mon law evolves as circumstances change and learning grows.” (footnotes omitted)).
40 See supra notes 19–26 and accompanying text.
41 See Bork, supra note 24, at 804 (concluding that Standard Oil announced “a rule of
reason keyed to the avoidance of the consequences of monopoly and had placed upon the
courts the duty of performing economic analysis to determine in which acts and agree-
ments the evils of monopoly were present”); id. at 805 (“It should be stressed that White’s
test was phrased wholly in economic terms, giving no evidence of concern for possibly
competing values.  A corollary of this value choice is that the law should develop according
to the progress of economic thought.  The law is, therefore, neither made inflexible by
controlling precedent nor required to change only through abrupt shifts of basic doctrine.
Thus a court could alter the law without repudiating the theory underlying prior decisions
by explaining that those decisions had misconceived the economic effect of particular
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II. JUSTICE SCALIA’S EMBRACE OF THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
Justice Scalia embraced the Chicago/Standard Oil approach to antitrust
questions.  His opinions in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,42
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,43 and East-
man Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.,44 all embraced the assumption
that the Sherman Act banned only those restraints or other conduct that
produced overall economic harm.45  Each decision also employed Chicago-
style reasoning to reach doctrinal results propounded or endorsed by leading
Chicago figures.46 Business Electronics in particular embraced Chicago’s nor-
mative, scientific, and jurisprudential facets.  For instance, in language remi-
niscent of Standard Oil’s reference to evolving economic conceptions, the
Justice expressly opined that antitrust courts could approve agreements that
1890 courts condemned, claiming that the Sherman Act adopted the com-
mon law governing trade restraints “along with its dynamic potential.”47  As a
result, he said, courts should ask whether challenged restraints produce “a
particular economic consequence,” and not, he said, whether such agree-
ments were enforceable or not when Congress passed the Act.48  Moreover,
agreements or practices.”); id. at 802 (explaining that in Standard Oil “a dynamic principle
was built into the rule of reason so that the law could change as economic understanding
progressed”).  Bork did not, it should be noted, mention Standard Oil’s invocation of lib-
erty of contract. See Meese, supra note 23, at 800–01 (discussing Bork’s failure to mention
Standard Oil’s invocation of liberty of contract).
42 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
43 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
44 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
45 Indeed, in Trinko, the Justice went so far as to conclude that the possession of
monopoly power in the short run did not, absent some anticompetitive conduct, violate
section 2. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407 (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the
concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important
element of the free-market system.  The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least
for a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk
taking that produces innovation and economic growth.  To safeguard the incentive to
innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accom-
panied by an element of anticompetitive conduct.”).  In so doing, the Justice mimicked the
statement in Standard Oil that the Sherman Act does not prohibit “monopoly in the con-
crete” but only that monopoly obtained by misuse of the right to contract. See 221 U.S 1,
62 (1911) (noting “the omission of any direct prohibition against monopoly in the con-
crete,” and concluding that a monopoly would not survive in the long run unless a “right to
make unlawful contracts having a monopolistic tendency were permitted”).
46 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 486–90 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47 See Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 732 (“The Sherman Act adopted the term ‘restraint of
trade’ along with its dynamic potential.  It invokes the common law itself, and not merely
the static content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.” (citing, inter
alia, BORK, supra note 31, at 37)); see also Bork, supra note 33, at 48 (opining that the
Sherman Act authorized courts “to revise not only prior judge-made rules but, it would
seem, rules contemplated by Congress”).
48 See Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 731 (“The term ‘restraint of trade’ in the statute, like the
term at common law, refers not to a particular list of agreements, but to a particular eco-
nomic consequence, which may be produced by quite different sorts of agreements in
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and again like Standard Oil, he opined that the only relevant consequence
that could require condemnation under the Rule of Reason was purely eco-
nomic, namely, the exercise of market power detrimental to consumers.49
Finally, relying on the (scientific) work of Robert Bork and Richard Posner,
he concluded that agreements whereby manufacturers ensured “the efficient
marketing of their products,” by combating retailer free riding, did not pro-
duce that prohibited consequence but instead furthered interbrand competi-
tion, “the primary concern of the antitrust law[s].”50
In addition to those antitrust opinions he authored himself, the Justice
joined several opinions that embraced a similar approach, including opin-
ions that invoked the Justice’s opinion in Business Electronics.  For instance,
the Justice joined Justice O’Connor’s unanimous opinion in State Oil Co. v.
Khan, which overturned the per se rule against maximum resale price main-
tenance announced in 1968.51  In Khan the Court unanimously embraced
modern economic critiques of the per se ban on maximum resale price main-
tenance.52  The Court cited Business Electronics for the proposition that analy-
sis of vertical restraints should be guided by the assumption that interbrand
competition is the primary concern of the antitrust laws.53  Invoking the
views of Robert Bork, Frank Easterbrook, Richard Posner, and others sympa-
thetic to the Chicago School, the Court concluded that the ban prevented
efficient marketing practices that furthered interbrand competition.54  It was
not enough that Albrecht’s per se rule was incorrect, however.  Instead, the
Court had to decide whether considerations of stare decisis nonetheless
required retention of the rule.  The Court conceded that stare decisis gener-
ally had a stronger claim in the statutory context and in cases involving prop-
erty and contract rights.55  Still, the Court concluded that such
considerations were less potent in the antitrust context, because “Congress
‘expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing
varying times and circumstances.  The changing content of the term ‘restraint of trade’ was
well recognized at the time the Sherman Act was enacted.”).
49 See id. at 725–26 (treating potential to facilitate cartelizing as the only potential
harm from vertical restraints); cf. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
59 (1977) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (contending that a restraint’s restriction
of dealer autonomy was a cognizable antitrust harm); id. at 67 (approving previous deci-
sions purportedly protecting the “freedom of the businessman to dispose of his own goods
as he sees fit”); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (concluding that a restraint’s
supposed impact on the “freedom” of individual traders was a cognizable antitrust harm),
overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
50 See Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 724–25 (stating that “interbrand competition [is] ‘the
primary concern of antitrust law’” (quoting Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 52 n.19)); id. at
726 (reiterating that promotion of interbrand competition is the primary consideration of
the antitrust laws).
51 522 U.S. at 18. Khan, of course, overruled Albrecht, 390 U.S. 145.
52 See Khan, 522 U.S. at 15–22.
53 Id. at 15 (citing Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 717, 726).
54 See id. at 15–16 (citing, inter alia, BORK, supra note 31, at 281–82; Frank H. Easter-
brook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 886, 887–90 (1981)).
55 See id. at 15–22.
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on common-law tradition.’”56  Quoting Business Electronics, the Court opined
that the Sherman Act “invokes the common law itself, and not merely the
static content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.”57  The
Court also repeated Business Electronics’ assertion that “ ‘different sorts of
agreements’ may amount to restraints of trade ‘in varying times and
circumstances.’”58
Perhaps most notably, the Justice joined the Court’s 2007 majority opin-
ion in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., supplying one of the
five votes for that hotly contested decision.59 Leegin, of course, overruled Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., repudiating the Sherman Act’s
ban on minimum resale price maintenance that had stood for ninety-six
years.60  While Justice Scalia did not write separately in Leegin, his voice was
nonetheless evident throughout the opinion.  Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion cited or quoted Business Electronics over ten times,61 includ-
ing for the propositions that: (1) the Sherman Act authorizes courts to adjust
antitrust doctrine in a common-law fashion in light of changed economic
conceptions and (2) the standard governing such adjustment is one of eco-
nomic efficiency.62  Moreover, the Justice endorsed Leegin’s description of
the Sherman Act as authorizing courts to create a common law of antitrust in
his recent treatise on legal interpretation.63
56 See id. at 20–21 (quoting Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
688 (1978)).
57 See id. at 21 (“As we have explained, the term ‘restraint of trade,’ as used in § 1, also
‘invokes the common law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had
assigned to the term in 1890.’” (quoting Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 732)).
58 See id. at 21 (quoting Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 731–32).
59 551 U.S. 877, 880 (2007); id. at 908–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (questioning the
Court’s assessment of the potential harms and benefits of minimum rpm and contending
that considerations of stare decisis required adherence to the longstanding per se rule
against minimum rpm).
60 Id. at 882 (majority opinion).
61 See id. at 886–905.
62 See, e.g., id. at 888 (“[T]he Sherman Act’s use of ‘restraint of trade’ ‘invokes the
common law itself, . . . not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to
the term in 1890.’” (quoting Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 732)); id. at 894 (proposing that per se
condemnation is only appropriate where the challenged agreement “always or almost
always tend[s] to restrict competition and decrease output” (quoting Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at
723)); id. at 887–900 (citing Business Electronics several times when discussing various posi-
tive and negative economic effects of minimum resale price maintenance).
63 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 96 (2012) (“[I]t is possible, though rare, for a statute to leave a matter to future
common-law development by the courts—either expressly or (where the statute deals with
a traditional field of common-law jurisprudence) by implication.  An example of the latter
is the Sherman Act, whose reference to ‘restraint of trade’ has always been taken to refer to
activity (so denominated) that the common law made unlawful—and to authorize continu-
ing development of that common law by federal courts.” (citing Leegin, 551 U.S. at 888)).
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Unlike Robert Bork, the Justice did not invoke the Sherman Act’s legisla-
tive history in support of the approach he articulated in Business Electronics.64
After all, Justice Scalia’s textualism excludes such reliance on such legislative
history as a guide to the meaning of the Act.65  Indeed, efforts by Bork and
others to derive meaning from the legislative history of the Act exemplify
some of the shortcomings of such exercises that the Justice identified.66  As a
textualist, the Justice also disclaimed any status as a common-law judge.67  At
64 See Bork, supra note 33, at 11. But see Daniel A. Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust:
Robert Bork and the Goals of Antitrust Policy, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 835, 844 (2014) (“Subjective
congressional intent, as manifested in legislative history, mattered far less than leading
criticisms of Bork suggest.  Bork’s arguments about the purposes of the antitrust laws were
primarily grounded in a conventional suite of interpretive methodologies, including tex-
tual analysis, a ‘whole code’ reading of the antitrust laws, critical analysis of leading judicial
expositors, and arguments about judicial restraint.  With the emergence of textualism and
‘objective’ approaches to statutory interpretation and the continued discussion about the
value and meaning of judicial restraint, Bork’s arguments should be understood as signifi-
cantly broader than the legislative history claims that have figured almost exclusively in the
criticisms of his arguments in favor reading the antitrust laws to advance a consumer wel-
fare objective.”).  It is perhaps noteworthy that Bork acknowledged that Justice Scalia was
“particularly helpful” with the final chapter of The Antitrust Paradox. See BORK, supra note
31, at xvi.  That chapter included several pages examining “Social Policy and the Lawmak-
ing Process,” including the process of judicial exposition of the meaning of the Sherman
Act. See id. at 408–18.
65 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
29–37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
66 See, e.g., id.; Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence:
The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998).  For instance, like
many who invoke the Act’s legislative history, Bork invokes various floor statements by
senators, including Senator Sherman, critiquing or praising various bills introduced by
Sherman.  Bork also invokes various common-law decisions discussed by Sherman as exem-
plifying a “highly artificial version of the common law” that exemplifies the operative prin-
ciple contained in the Act.  Bork, supra note 33, at 13.
None of Sherman’s proposals ever became law, however.  Instead, the Senate reas-
signed jurisdiction over Sherman’s bill to the Judiciary Committee, which rewrote the bill
in its entirety. See WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLU-
TION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 94 (Random House 1965) (1954) (“The Judiciary
Committee took the matter out of Sherman’s hands, much to his regret and anger.”);
HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADI-
TION 198–99 (1955).  Sherman both excoriated the new bill and signaled his support on
the same day. See LETWIN, supra, at 94.  Bork recognized this potential disconnect but
contended that the bill that ultimately passed reflected the very same policy as the various
versions that Sherman introduced. See Bork, supra note 33, at 15–17; see also LETWIN,
supra, at 94 (contending that the final statutory language was “in broad outline the same as
Sherman’s original bill”).  Other scholars disagree after reviewing the very same legislative
history Bork reviewed. See, e.g., PERITZ, supra note 23, at 20–26 (concluding that the final
amendment narrowed the scope of the Act compared to prior drafts); MARTIN J. SKLAR,
THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890–1916, at 89–91 (1988)
(same).
67 See SCALIA, supra note 65, at 14 (“[A]ttacking the enterprise [of statutory interpreta-
tion] with the Mr. Fix-it mentality of the common-law judge is a sure recipe for incompe-
tence and usurpation.”).
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first glance, these interpretive commitments are difficult to square with the
Justice’s jurisprudential embrace of Chicago antitrust or for that matter Stan-
dard Oil’s Rule of Reason.  The Chicago School, after all, is just that, a school
of antitrust thought.  Moreover, the Sherman Act is a statute, and one passed
long before there was a Chicago School.  The text of the Act does not men-
tion efficiency, competition, prices, output, or any synonyms of these terms.
Nor does it purport to authorize judges or any other officials to adjust the
meaning of “in restraint of trade” in response to changing economic theory
or anything else.  If, as the Justice passionately argued, federal judges must
abjure both legislative history and a common-law approach to reading and
applying statutes, how can they engraft onto the Sherman Act concepts such
as “allocative efficiency” and “free riding”?  Moreover, how can such judges
condemn restraints deemed perfectly lawful by the Congress that passed the
Act or validate those the 1890 Congress would have condemned?  To put a
finer point on things, how does the “ordinary public meaning” of the term
“in restraint of trade” in 1890 empower unelected judges to transform the
Chicago School of antitrust analysis—or any other school for that matter—
into federal law?
Some scholars have noticed what they believe to be a disconnect
between Justice Scalia’s professed method of statutory interpretation and his
embrace of Chicago’s antitrust prescriptions.68  Most notably, Daniel Farber
and Brett McDonnell contend that it is simply not possible to reconcile
“modern antitrust,” including Business Electronics, with Justice Scalia’s pro-
fessed commitment to a “textual” method of interpretation.  In particular,
these scholars contend that the term “in restraint of trade” was, in 1890, a
legal term of art laden with meaning developed by common-law courts,
including the Supreme Court itself.69  Justice Scalia’s brand of textualism,
they say, would require the Court to read the phrase “in restraint of trade” to
incorporate that meaning, banning those contracts deemed unenforceable at
common law when Congress passed the Sherman Act.70  Embrace of the Chi-
cago School approach, they say, contradicts this result.  To be precise, these
scholars assert that the common law of 1890 did not embrace efficiency or
even the welfare of purchasers as the exclusive animating principle in such
cases.71  Instead, they claim that the “common law’s goals were fairness and
economic independence” and that the common law “was frequently indiffer-
68 See Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text in This Class?” The Con-
flict Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619 (2005); see also Law-
rence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1250 (1993) (suggesting that
Business Electronics’ endorsement of “consumer welfare” as the animating principle of anti-
trust is, as a historical matter, “on weak ground”).
69 See Farber & McDonnell, supra note 68, at 660; see also, e.g., Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S.
88 (1889) (exercising diversity jurisdiction over an action alleging breach of contract);
Gibbs v. Consol. Gas Co. of Balt., 130 U.S. 396 (1889) (same); Or. Steam Navigation Co. v.
Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 66 (1873) (exercising appellate jurisdiction over a territorial
court’s adjudication of a contract dispute).
70 See Farber & McDonnell, supra note 68, at 640.
71 See id. at 633–35.
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ent to whether the restraint of trade involved any significant portion of the
market.”72  These scholars also contend that the Justice’s brand of textualism
would probably preclude courts from taking a dynamic approach to this com-
mon law, thereby freezing into place whatever rules governing trade
restraints were extant in 1890.73  If dynamism is appropriate, they say, federal
courts should defer to the common law developed by state courts instead of
developing such law themselves.74  Justice Scalia’s approach to the contrary,
they say, confers absolute discretion on courts and exemplifies “judicial activ-
ism,”75 and “raw pursuit of policy outcomes.”76
Farber and McDonnell are not lonely voices.  Indeed, they invoke previ-
ous claims to the same effect by William Eskridge and John Ferejohn.77
These scholars contend that courts have treated the Sherman Act as one of a
handful of “super statutes” of quasi-constitutional dimension that differ in
various ways from run of the mill “ordinary legislation.”78  Super statutes, it is
said, differ from ordinary legislation in a variety of ways, not the least of
which is the approach courts take to interpreting them.  While courts often
apply textual methods to discern the meaning of ordinary legislation, they
purportedly approach super statutes in a purposive manner, reading such
72 See id. at 632; see also, e.g., Christopher Grandy, Original Intent and the Sherman Anti-
trust Act: A Re-Examination of the Consumer-Welfare Hypothesis, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 359, 369
(1993) (“[I]n the common law agreements or combinations in restraint of trade had a
meaning for state courts that cannot be reconciled with the consumer-welfare hypothesis.
As a number of authors make clear, the application of this term nearly always referred to
limiting or prohibiting someone from engaging in a particular trade or business.  The
common law distinguished between lawful and unlawful restraints of trade by the extent or
reasonableness of the restraint.  On the one hand, the potential purchaser of a business
might balk if the seller could immediately start another, competing enterprise.  On the
other hand, the courts would not sanction a permanent restraint on an individual’s ability
to earn a living.  The common law clearly applied the term ‘restraint of trade’ to relations
among producers.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Bork, supra note 36 (contending that
common-law courts sometimes enforced agreements that protected producers and injured
consumer welfare, and arguing that the Sherman Act condemns such agreements regard-
less of their status at common law). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and
the Classical Theory of Competition, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1019 (1989) (discussing the evolution of
common law in response to changes in economic theory).
73 See Farber & McDonnell, supra note 68, at 632; see also Lessig, supra note 68, at 1248,
1248 n.316 (noting that the Justice had not reconciled the dynamic approach taken in
Business Electronics with purportedly more static approaches taken in other cases (citing
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 650 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (stating, interpreting the Due Process Clause, that “[i]t is precisely the his-
torical practices that define what is ‘due’”); and then citing California v. Hodari D., 499
U.S. 621 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (interpreting the Fourth Amendment using traditional com-
mon-law definitions of “seizure”)).
74 See Farber & McDonnell, supra note 68, at 632.
75 Id. at 621.
76 See id. at 661.
77 See id. at 622–23.
78 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215
(2001).
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enactments broadly so as to give full effect to the principles contained
therein.79  Such readings, they say, will “generate a dynamic common law
implementing [the statute’s] great principle.”80  Justice Scalia’s approach to
the Sherman Act, they say, particularly his opinion in Business Electronics,
exemplifies such a purposive approach.  As they put it:
Although the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have emphasized plain meanings
and common law backgrounds in statutory cases more than their predecessors,
they have nonetheless construed the Sherman Act in the purposive, evolu-
tive way the New Deal and Warren Courts did.  Indeed, the boldest state-
ment of this methodology came from archtextualist Antonin Scalia, who,
after presenting an intricate economic analysis of a challenged vertical
restraint [in Business Electronics], had this to say about the statute.81
Eskridge and Ferejohn then quote Business Electronics for the proposition that
the Sherman Act bans agreements with “particular economic conse-
quence[s], which may be produced by quite different sorts of agreements in
varying times” and “adopted [the common law] along with its dynamic poten-
tial.”82  Like Farber and McDonnell, then, Eskridge and Ferejohn assume
that a normal originalist approach would treat the Sherman Act as “ordinary
legislation” focused on the “plain meaning” or “common law background” of
the Act and produce a different approach from that articulated in Business
Electronics.83  Other scholars have agreed that Justice Scalia’s account of the
Sherman Act deviates from his professed textualist method of interpreta-
tion.84  Indeed, none other than Richard Posner has claimed that Leegin,
79 Compare id. at 1234 (“To begin with, a super-statute will generally be applied in a
purposive rather than simple text-bounded or originalist way.  It will generate a dynamic
common law implementing its great principle and adapting the statute to meet the chal-
lenges posed to that principle by a complex society.”), and id. at 1249 (stating that super
statutes “are to be construed liberally and purposively, interpreters should apply words
broadly and evolutively”), with id. at 1249 (“For ordinary statutes, which are to be construed
in a regular way, interpreters should apply words in the normal range used by ordinary
speakers of the language.”).
80 Id. at 1234.
81 Id. (emphasis added).
82 See id. at 1234–35 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,
731–32 (1988)).
83 See id. at 1249 (“For ordinary statutes, which are to be construed in a regular way,
interpreters should apply words in the normal range used by ordinary speakers of the
language.”).
84 See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 68, at 1250 (suggesting that Business Electronics’ embrace
of consumer welfare as the operative Sherman Act standard was “on weak [historical]
ground”); Miranda McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say: An Empirical Investigation of Justice
Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 MISS. L.J. 129, 134 (2008) (con-
tending that Justice Scalia “entirely suspends textualism” when interpreting the Sherman
Act); see also Max Huffman, A Reluctant Standard-Bearer for the Chicago School, CPI ANTITRUST
CHRON., Summer 2016, at 3 (“[A]ntitrust is a decidedly poor exemplar for Justice Scalia’s
textualist interpretive philosophy.  Textualism in the antitrust arena produces perverse
results.  Early antitrust cases, relying on text more than they did the purposes of the law,
sometimes seemed to hold that any commercial contracts might present antitrust problems
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which Justice Scalia joined without comment and subsequently endorsed,
contradicts the common law of 1890, which simply banned “restraints on
alienation,” with the result that the Justice’s (dynamic) determination to the
contrary contradicts his professed method of interpretation.85
These scholars are certainly correct that common-law terms of art can
supply statutory meaning when courts employ an originalist interpretative
methodology.  Justice Scalia himself embraced this canon on more than one
occasion, both on and off the bench.  For instance, dissenting in Moskal v.
United States, he chided the Court for reading a statutory term of art in a way
that contravened the term’s well-established common-law meaning.86  In so
doing, the Justice invoked previous decisions and commentary by Justices
Jackson and Frankfurter:
The Court acknowledges, as it must, the doctrine that when a statute
employs a term with a specialized legal meaning relevant to the matter at
hand, that meaning governs.  As Justice Jackson explained for the Court in
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952):
“[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the
legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows
and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in
the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will
convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed.  In such a case,
absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely
accepted definitions, not as departure from them.”
Or as Justice Frankfurter more poetically put it: “[I]f a word is obviously
transplanted from another legal source, whether the common law or other
legislation, it brings its soil with it.”
We have such an obvious transplant before us here.87
Moreover, in California v. Hodari D., the Justice invoked the common law
to define the meaning of the term “seizure” as employed in the Fourth
Amendment, even though the resulting definition was broader and more
protective of criminal defendants than the plain meaning of the term.88
Indeed, when discerning the content of the common law, the Justice invoked
because they ‘restrained trade,’ in however limited a manner.  No serious thinker makes a
practice of applying textualist interpretive philosophy to antitrust law.” (footnotes
omitted)).
85 See Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 24,
2012), https://newrepublic.com/article/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-ori
ginalism.
86 See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 121 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87 Id. (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 537 (1947)).
88 499 U.S. 621 (1990); id. at 626 n.2 (“We have consulted the common law to explain
the meaning of seizure—and, contrary to the dissent’s portrayal, to expand rather than
contract that meaning (since one would not normally think that the mere touching of a
person would suffice).”).
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sources published more than a century after ratification of the constitutional
provision in question.89
The Justice repeated his support for this canon more than two decades
later, in his treatise on interpretation.90  That treatise endorsed “[t]he age-
old principle . . . that words undefined in a statute are to be interpreted and
applied according to their common-law meanings.”91  In so doing, he
quoted, inter alia, Justice Harlan’s statement that “in the absence of anything
to the contrary it is fair to assume that Congress used that word in the statute
in its common-law sense.”92
These remarks would only seem to bolster contentions by Farber,
McDonnell, and others that the Justice’s professed approach to statutory
interpretation requires judges to give statutory terms of art their common-law
meaning.  As applied to the Sherman Act, it would seem, this canon of con-
struction would require courts to read the term “contracts or combinations
in restraint of trade” to invoke the most relevant common law in place when
Congress passed the Act, namely, that portion of the common law of con-
tracts governing judicial enforcement of agreements that allegedly consti-
tuted contracts or combinations “in restraint of trade.”  Such agreements, of
course, included covenants not to compete that accompanied the sale of a
business,93 covenants ancillary to the formation of a partnership,94 agree-
ments between rivals to limit production or prices,95 covenants ancillary to
an employment relationship,96 agreements that dealers would charge mini-
mum prices,97 and covenants ancillary to the sale of a chattel that prevent the
purchaser from using the chattel in competition with the seller.98  Some of
these agreements constituted “combinations,” while others constituted con-
89 See id. at 626–27 (quoting Rollin M. Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REV. 201,
206 (1940)).
90 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 63, at 320–21; see also John F. Manning, What
Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006) (describing and endors-
ing Justice Scalia’s application of this canon in Moskal as a valid method of implementing
textualism).
91 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 63, at 320.
92 See id. n.5 (quoting, with approval, Gilbert v. United States, 370 U.S. 650, 655 (1962)
(Harlan, J.) (“[I]t is therefore important to inquire . . . into the common-law meaning of
forgery at the time the 1823 statute was enacted.  For in the absence of anything to the
contrary it is fair to assume that Congress used that word in the statute in its common-law
sense.”)).
93 See, e.g., Alger v. Thacher, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 51 (1837).
94 See, e.g., Matthews v. Associated Press of N.Y., 32 N.E. 981, 983 (N.Y. 1893)
(Peckham, J.) (“A business partnership could provide that none of its members should
attend to any business other than that of the partnership, and that each partner who came
in must agree not to do any other business and must give up all such business as he had
theretofore done.”).
95 See, e.g., Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App. 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1880).
96 See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 85 F. 271, 281, 290–91 (6th Cir.
1898).
97 See, e.g., Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88 (1889).
98 See, e.g., Or. Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64 (1873).
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tracts.99  Moreover, even if the resulting common law is dynamic, the Justice’s
methodology would merely authorize judges to apply a fixed standard in
light of exogenous changes in society, the economy, and economic theory.100
If Farber and McDonnell (and others) are correct that the common law of
1890 rejected efficiency in favor of fairness and individual autonomy, for
instance, then the Justice’s conclusion that section 1 only bans restraints with
particular economic consequences, i.e., the exercise of market power to the
detriment of consumers, would seem to contradict his professed interpretive
methodology.101
Not so fast.  The Justice’s Business Electronics opinion itself purported to
embrace the common law of trade restraints.102  Thus, the Farber/McDon-
nell critique thus far depends critically upon the Farber/McDonnell account
of the common law, a purely historical question.  It should be noted that
others have also examined the original meaning of the Act from a textualist
perspective and obtained different results.  For instance, Robert Lande,
whose scholarship regarding the original meaning of the Sherman Act is
among the most influential, has conducted a “traditional and textual analysis
of the goals of antitrust,” including an analysis of certain common-law
cases.103  Lande concludes that the Sherman Act bans only those contracts
and other practices that “restrict[ ] output and therefore raise[ ] prices.”104
To be sure, Lande’s exegesis of the caselaw is far from complete.  Still, he
discusses more common-law cases than Farber and McDonnell, who rely
entirely upon secondary sources.
99 See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 72 (discussing the evolution of common law in
response to changes in economic theory).
100 See Cty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 59–71 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(relying on the common law of search and seizure to determine the unchanging standard
that courts should apply when determining the appropriate length of detention before a
magistrate determines that there is probable cause to detain an arrestee); id. at 6 n.1
(explaining that proper application of this unchanging principle can evolve as technology
changes); see also Lessig, supra note 68, at 1247–50 (asserting that the changed application
of the Sherman Act in response to evolving economic theory exemplified faithful applica-
tion of the original meaning of the Act).
101 See Farber & McDonnell, supra note 68, at 633.
102 Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (“The Sherman Act
adopted the term ‘restraint of trade’ along with its dynamic potential.  It invokes the com-
mon law itself, and not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the
term in 1890.”).
103 See Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textual Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust: Effi-
ciency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2349, 2351
(2013) (describing interpretive methodology as entailing analysis of “key terms as they
were used in contemporary dictionaries, legal treatises, common law cases, and the earliest
U.S. antitrust cases”); id. at 2370, 2374–75 (discussing cases).
104 Id. at 2372 (“In summary, section 1 of the Sherman Act’s prohibition against con-
tracts, combinations, or conspiracies ‘in restraint of trade’ was not directed at business
arrangements that are inefficient.  Rather, a ‘restraint of trade’ usually means a practice
that restricts output and therefore raises prices.”).  Unfortunately, Lande did not expressly
respond to the contrary arguments made by Farber, McDonnell, Eskridge, and Ferejohn.
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Perhaps more importantly, in Standard Oil v. United States, the Supreme
Court conducted a textual analysis, including a lengthy exegesis of the com-
mon law.105  That common law, the Court determined, came to equate
“monopoly” with practices, including contracts in restraint of trade that,
while not resulting in domination of an entire market, still produced the
consequences of monopoly, particularly the enhancement of prices.106  Like
Professor Lande, the Court determined that, instead of banning a fixed set of
agreements, the statute articulates a standard implementing the “public pol-
icy of the act” banning only those restraints that produce monopoly or the
consequences of monopoly, particularly higher prices and reduced out-
put.107  Moreover, as explained earlier, the Standard Oil Court concluded
that courts applying this “standard of reason” should recognize that “eco-
nomic conceptions” change over time and apply the latest conception when
evaluating the impact of a restraint.108  Justice Scalia cited Standard Oil in
support of his claim that the Sherman Act adopted the common law along
with its dynamic potential.109
Neither Farber and McDonnell nor Eskridge and Ferejohn mentions
Standard Oil or its conclusion that the common law in place when Congress
passed the Sherman Act articulated a dynamic standard that focused on the
economic consequences of monopoly.  Nor, of course, does either explain
why the Court should overrule this century-old decision.  Finally, it is perhaps
worthy of note that the Supreme Court’s earliest expositions of the Sherman
Act either expressly rejected the common law as the source of the Sherman
Act’s meaning or ignored it altogether.110  These decisions occurred during
105 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
106 Id. at 54–59 (describing the evolution of English common law leading to the ten-
dency to equate “monopoly” with practices resulting in the consequences of monopoly,
including contracts in restraint of trade); id. at 58 (describing the public policy of English
and American common law as condemning agreements “tending to bring about the evils,
such as enhancement of prices, which were considered to be against public policy”); id. at
52 (describing the evils produced by monopoly as higher prices, reduced production, and
reduced quality).
107 See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text; infra note 108 and accompanying
text.
108 See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 55.
109 See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (citing Standard
Oil, 221 U.S. at 51–60).
110 See United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 327 (1897) (rejecting the
defendants’ argument that the statute banned only “those restraints and monopolies which
the common law regarded as unlawful”); id. at 325, 327–29 (explaining that the “plain and
ordinary meaning” of “contracts in restraint of trade” included both reasonable and unrea-
sonable restraints and that the statute banned both, regardless of whether such contracts
were enforceable at common law); see also Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175
U.S. 211 (1899) (declaring a horizontal cartel that set unreasonable prices an unlawful
direct restraint of trade without reference to the common law); United States v. Joint Traf-
fic Ass’n, 171 U.S 505, 566 (1898) (holding that the statute banned only direct restraints of
trade and thus did not reach “ordinary contracts and combinations” such as covenants
ancillary to the sale of a business); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898) (same).
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an era in which the Court generally took a textualist approach to statutory
interpretation.  Given the disparate results of what all purport to be efforts to
derive the meaning of the Sherman Act via a textualist approach, this Essay
makes yet another effort at a textual analysis of section 1, employing Justice
Scalia’s expressed methodology for interpreting statutes.111
III. A TEXTUALIST ANALYSIS OF SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combina-
tion . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States.”112  Webster’s 1886 Complete Dictionary of the English Language defines
“restraint” as “[t]hat which restrains, as a law, a prohibition, and the like;
limitation; restriction.”113  The same source defines “restrain” as “[t]o limit;
to confine; to restrict.”114  Stormonth’s Dictionary of the English Language
defines “restraint” as: “the act of restraining; abridgment of liberty; restric-
tion; hindrance of will; repression; that which restrains.”115  The same source
defines “restrain” as: “to hold back; to bind fast; to curb; to repress; to limit;
It should also be noted that Judge Posner’s critique of Leegin contradicts the common law
of minimum rpm articulated by the Supreme Court one year before passage of the Sher-
man Act, in Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88 (1889) (sustaining minimum resale price mainte-
nance as an enforceable agreement); see also Garst v. Harris, 58 N.E. 174 (Mass. 1900)
(Holmes, C.J.) (invoking Fowle as authority for the enforceability of a minimum rpm
agreement).
111 Of course, stare decisis may itself require judicial adherence to Standard Oil.  How-
ever, because the Justice expressed a willingness to overrule prior interpretations of a stat-
ute, a de novo textual analysis of the Sherman Act would seem appropriate. Cf. Johnson v.
Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 669–77 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that the
Court should overrule Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)).
112 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (emphasis added).
113 See Restraint, WEBSTER’S COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1128
(Chauncey A. Goodrich et al. eds., London, George Bell & Sons 1886).
114 Id.  Webster’s also included alternate meanings for “restraint” and “restrain.”  For
instance, the first entry for “restraint” defines the term as: “The act or exercise of
restraining, or of holding back or hindering from motion, in any manner; hinderance of
the will, or of any action, physical, moral, or mental,” id., and the first entry for “restrain” is
as follows: “To draw back again; to hold back; to check; to hold from acting, proceeding, or
advancing, either by physical or moral force, or by any interposing obstacle;—to repress or
suppress; to keep down,” id. Given the context, that is, “restraint of trade or commerce,” it
would appear that the definition quoted in the text is that which most likely reflects how an
“ordinary member of Congress” might define the term. See Smith v. United States, 508
U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court does not appear to grasp the
distinction between how a word can be used and how it ordinarily is used.”); Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that the task of the
judge is to read “the words of [a statutory] text as any ordinary Member of Congress would
have read them and apply the meaning so determined” (citation omitted)); SCALIA & GAR-
NER, supra note 63, at 418 (“Because common words typically have more than one mean-
ing, you must use the context in which a given word appears to determine its aptest, most
likely sense.”).
115 See Restraint, JAMES STORMONTH, ETYMOLOGICAL AND PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 525 (Edinburgh, William Blackwood & Sons 7th ed. rev. 1882); see
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-5\NDL506.txt unknown Seq: 22 15-JUN-17 7:54
2034 notre dame law review [vol. 92:5
to abridge.”116  Justice Scalia’s coauthored treatise on interpretation
endorsed both sources as “reflect[ing] meanings given at the current time”
and “among the most useful and authoritative for the English language gen-
erally and for law.”117
A straightforward application of these definitions could sweep quite
broadly.  For instance, a definition could require prohibition of every contract
that “limits,” “confines,” or “restricts” commerce or “abridges liberty.”
Numerous garden-variety commercial arrangements would seem to offend
such a ban.  For instance, a covenant ancillary to the sale of a business
whereby a seller agrees not to sell its wares within a certain geographic area
would literally “confine” commerce and certainly “limit,” “curb,” and
“restrict” it.118  Moreover, an agreement by the purchaser of a chattel, say, a
steamship, not to use the vessel in competition against the seller “abridges
the liberty” of the buyer and again “confines,” “curbs,” “restricts,” or “limits”
commerce.119
For over a century, beginning with the Standard Oil decision, the
Supreme Court has avoided the consequences of such a plain meaning
approach by reading section 1 so as to ban only “unreasonable” restraints,
often employing a variant of the absurdity canon.120  In particular, the Court
also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 63, at 419, 421 (listing this source among “authoritative”
dictionaries of the period).
116 See Restrain, STORMONTH, supra note 115, at 525.
117 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 63, at 419, 421 (approving Webster’s 1882 edition
“or other editions during the period” 1851–1900 as “reflect[ing] meanings current at a
given time” and among “the most useful and authoritative for the English language gener-
ally and for law”).
118 See Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419 (N.Y. 1887) (enforcing a covenant by
the seller of a manufacturing business not to compete with the purchaser in the entire
continental United States except the state of Nevada and territory of Montana).  The seller
purportedly breached the covenant by working for a competing manufacturer of matches
and opening his own retail store that sold matches in the territory governed by the agree-
ment.  See id. at 479.  At the time, of course, numerous decisions of the Supreme Court
defined “commerce” as the buying and selling of products as well as “traffic,” navigation,
and other travel. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 35 (1824).  Thus, the
contract purported to limit the defendant’s right to engage in commerce, albeit intrastate.
119 Or. Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64, 65 (1873) (enforcing
such a restraint preventing the purchaser from operating vessels on “several routes of
travel on the rivers, bays, and waters of . . . California” (emphasis omitted)); see also Hop-
kins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898) (recounting the contention by the United States
that a private agreement not to send telegrams to possible sellers infringed upon the lib-
erty of the parties to the agreement because imposition of a similar ban by a state would be
unconstitutional); cf. Gibbons, 22 (9 Wheat.) U.S. 1 (concluding that navigation between
two or more states is interstate commerce).
120 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 54 (1911); United States v.
Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911) (characterizing Standard Oil as affording the
statute a “reasonable construction” so as to give the statute a “meaning which would not . . .
render difficult if not impossible any movement of trade in the channels of interstate com-
merce—the free movement of which it was the purpose of the statute to protect”); id.
(stating that the contrary interpretation would “destroy[ ] all liberty of contract and all
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has repeatedly noted that all contracts restrain trade to some degree, with the
result that a “plain meaning” approach to section 1 would ban all commercial
agreements and grind commerce to a halt.121  Congress could not have
intended this result, the Court says, with the result that the statute should
only ban restraints that the Court deems unreasonable.122  In its earlier
incarnation, this approach also served to avoid the sort of broad reading of
the Act that the Lochner-era Court believed would violate liberty of con-
tract.123  At times, albeit not recently, the Court has invoked legislative his-
tory to support this conclusion.124
substantial right to trade, and thus causing the act to be at war with itself by annihilating
the fundamental right of freedom to trade which, on the very face of the act, it was enacted
to preserve”).
121 See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687–88 (1978) (“The
statute says that ‘every’ contract that restrains trade is unlawful.  But, as Mr. Justice Bran-
deis perceptively noted; restraint is the very essence of every contract; read literally, § 1
would outlaw the entire body of private contract law.  Yet it is that body of law that estab-
lishes the enforceability of commercial agreements and enables competitive markets—
indeed, a competitive economy—to function effectively.” (footnotes omitted) (citing Bd.
of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1917) (Brandeis, J.))); see also Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (“While § 1 could be
interpreted to proscribe all contracts, the Court has never ‘taken a literal approach to [its]
language.’  Rather, the Court has repeated time and again that § 1 ‘outlaw[s] only unrea-
sonable restraints.’” (citations omitted) (first citing Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 238;
then quoting Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006); and then quoting State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997))); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606
(1972) (“On its face, § 1 of the Sherman Act appears to bar any combination of entrepre-
neurs so long as it is ‘in restraint of trade.’  Theoretically, all manufacturers, distributors,
merchants, sellers, and buyers could be considered as potential competitors of each other.
Were § 1 to be read in the narrowest possible way, any commercial contract could be
deemed to violate it.”).
122 Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 342–43 (1982) (“Section 1 of the
Sherman Act of 1890 literally prohibits every agreement ‘in restraint of trade.’ . . . [W]e
[have] recognized that Congress could not have intended a literal interpretation of the
word ‘every’ [ ] since [Standard Oil] [and thus] have analyzed most restraints under the so-
called ‘rule of reason.’” (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted)); N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (“Although this prohibition is literally all-encompassing, the
courts have construed it as precluding only those contracts or combinations which ‘unrea-
sonably’ restrain competition.” (citations omitted)).
123 See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 63; Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 180 (“[Standard Oil held
that] the duty to interpret which inevitably arose from the general character of the term
restraint of trade required that the words restraint of trade should be given a meaning
which would not destroy the individual right to contract and render difficult if not impossi-
ble any movement of trade in the channels of interstate commerce—the free movement of
which it was the purpose of the statute to protect.”); see also Meese, supra note 23 (explain-
ing that Standard Oil’s Rule of Reason implemented Lochner-like protection for liberty of
contract).
124 See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 688 (“Congress, however, did not
intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the full meaning of the statute or its
application in concrete situations.  The legislative history makes it perfectly clear that it
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While some proponents of textualism have cast doubt upon the absurd-
ity canon,125 Justice Scalia endorsed the canon, or at least what he called a
“narrow version” of it.126  According to the Justice, two conditions must coin-
cide to justify application of the canon.  First, the absurdity “must consist of a
disposition that no reasonable person could intend.”127  More precisely, and
quoting Joseph Story, “the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision
to the case [must] be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesita-
tion, unite in rejecting the application.”128  Mere oddity or anomaly does not
suffice.129  Second, the absurdity must be “reparable by changing or supply-
ing a particular word or phrase whose inclusion or omission was obviously a
technical or ministerial error.”130  Satisfaction of these two conditions, the
Justice said, establishes that the apparent anomaly was a drafting error, an
error that changing or applying a particular word corrects.131
Application of the absurdity doctrine as articulated by the Justice does
not provide a convincing textualist account of the meaning of section 1.  For
instance, even if one assumes that application of the plain language would
produce “monstrous” results that no reasonable person would accept, there
is still the separate question of what word or phrase a Court should insert or
redact so as to ensure a nonabsurd meaning.  In Standard Oil, of course, the
Court basically inserted the phrase “unreasonable” to precede the word
“restraint,” with the result that the statue banned “every contract or combina-
tion in unreasonable restraint of trade.”132  However, “unreasonable” is not
expected the courts to give shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-
law tradition.”).
125 See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2003).
126 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 63, at 234–39 (discussing the canon with approval);
SCALIA, supra note 65 (same); Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory
and Constitutional Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1614 (2012) (expressing sup-
port for the narrow version of the absurdity canon as a means of “giving the text the mean-
ing that any reasonable person would give it”); id. (“You can call it the absurdity doctrine,
if you like, so long as you define it as narrowly as I have.”); cf. SCALIA, supra note 65, at
18–23 (criticizing Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), a classic
application of the absurdity canon).
127 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 63, at 237.
128 Id. (quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 427, at 303 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 3d ed. 1858)).
129 Id.; see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393,
414 n.13 (2010) (“The possible existence of a few outlier instances does not prove [that
an] interpretation is absurd.  Congress may well have accepted such anomalies as the price
of a uniform system of federal procedure.”).
130 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 63, at 238.
131 SCALIA, supra note 65, at 20 (characterizing the doctrine as “lapsus linguae (slip of
the tongue), and what our modern cases call ‘scrivener’s error,’ where on the very face of
the statute it is clear to the reader that a mistake of expression (rather than of legislative
wisdom) has been made”).
132 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60, 64 (1911); see also Nat’l
Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (endorsing Standard Oil’s
approach on this score).
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the only word or phrase the insertion of which would remove any absurdity.
One could, instead, insert the word “unfair” (as Farber and McDonnell might
do) or, as the Supreme Court would do in the 1890s, “direct.”133  Moreover,
as suggested by some of the discussion below, the Court could have struck “of
trade or,” thus leaving the operative portion of the statute to read “in
restraint of commerce among the several states.”134
In any event, even if the word “reasonable” were the only possible inser-
tion, such insertion would still beg the question of the content of the stan-
dard imposed.  As various Supreme Court decisions confirm, Standard Oil’s
equation of “unreasonableness” with “the exercise of market power to the
detriment of consumers,” is not the only method for defining the term.135
One could also equate unreasonableness with “unfairness,” “excessiveness,”
or undue interference with the autonomy of traders.136  Moreover, even
Standard Oil’s apparent focus on market power is potentially ambiguous.
After all, the exercise of such power produces two potential harms: injury to
those individuals who continue to purchase the relevant product compared
to the results of a competitive market—a wealth transfer—and the reduction
in output and consequent reallocation of resources to less valuable uses.137
The choice between these two accounts of the harm produced by the exer-
cise of market power itself has implications for antitrust doctrine.138
In any event, there is a more fundamental roadblock to application of
the absurdity canon in this context.  For, as others have explained, textualists
need only apply this doctrine as a last resort; that is, when other canons of
construction and interpretive methods fail to produce a nonabsurd mean-
ing.139  As John Manning has said, “modern textualism screens out many
133 See Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 599–602 (1898) (holding that the Act
must have a “reasonable construction” and thus did not reach practices that merely
restrained commerce “indirectly”); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S 505, 568
(1898) (holding that the Act must have a reasonable construction and that the statute only
reaches direct restraints); infra notes 153–69 and accompanying text (discussing 1880s
Commerce Clause jurisprudence invalidating state laws imposing direct burdens on inter-
state commerce even absent congressional action).
134 See infra notes 145–69 and accompanying text.
135 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (banning as unrea-
sonable per se ancillary restraints between small market participants despite a judicial find-
ing that such restraints enhanced interbrand competition without harming consumers,
because such restraints reduce the autonomy of traders); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (banning as unreasonable
per se maximum resale price maintenance, which reduced consumer prices because, inter
alia, the restraint interfered with the “freedom” of traders to set whatever price they
wished, including prices that exercised market power to the detriment of consumers).
136 Cf. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.).
137 See Lande, supra note 103, at 2381–83 (describing these two possible harms).
138 See Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An
Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471 (2012).
139 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 125, at 2464–65 (explaining how reliance upon terms
of art can “mitigat[e] the rigors of literalism” and thereby obviate the need for reliance
upon the absurdity canon).
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absurdities at the threshold by accounting for the contextual nuances of lan-
guage, especially the particular nuances and conventions that the subcom-
munity of legal speakers has developed to facilitate effective legal
communication.”140  The approach, of course, is consistent with the Court’s
more general willingness, endorsed by Justice Scalia, to prefer technical
meanings to the ordinary or plain meaning of a statutory provision.141  If,
absurdity canon to one side, methods of ascertaining contextual nuances of
language produce a more plausible meaning than the “ordinary or plain
meaning” of a provision, then courts must instead ask whether that (nonordi-
nary) meaning is absurd.
Reliance on the common-law term of art canon is one such mechanism
for identifying such contextual linguistic nuances and thus discovering mean-
ings that are less absurd, or not absurd at all, compared to the statute’s plain
meaning.142  Thus, proponents of the approach advanced by Farber and
McDonnell might contend that any absurdity is illusory, given the availability
of common-law precedents to supply meaning to the term “restraint of
trade.”  Assuming that the common law of 1890 was not absurd, and would
not be absurd if incorporated as the operative standard of the Sherman Act,
the absurdity canon seems of little use when interpreting section 1.143
This is not to say that a more nuanced interpretation and resulting rejec-
tion of the absurdity canon necessarily means that section 1 takes its meaning
from the common law.  After all, the common law of 1890 may not be the
only potential source of meaning distinct from ordinary meaning.  Some
reflection suggests that this is likely not the case; that is, that there is another
possible source of such meaning.  Moreover, the existence of this source
helps explain why, contrary to the conclusions of some scholars, the Court
did not embrace the 1890 common law of trade restraints when it first gave
meaning to the Act.144
To help identify this alternative source of meaning one must return to
the source of Congress’s authority to regulate contracts and combinations.
Unlike the states, after all, the Congress of 1890 had no general authority
over private contracts.145  The Sherman Act was, instead, an exercise of the
140 Id. at 2458.
141 See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 63, at 73.
142 See Manning, supra note 125, at 2464–65 (explaining how reliance on the common-
law canon can identify nonabsurd statutory meaning and thus avoid reliance upon the
absurdity canon).
143 See Farber & McDonnell, supra note 68, at 640.
144 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 61–65 (asserting that federal courts initially
turned to the common law to provide meaning to the Act); see also United States v. Addys-
ton Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 278–91 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.) (examining common law
of trade restraints when assessing the defendant’s claim that horizontal restraints setting
reasonable prices do not violate the Sherman Act).  It should be noted that even Taft did
not hold that section 1 of the Sherman Act and the common law were coextensive.
Instead, he simply assumed this to be the case for the sake of argument. Id.
145 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824) (holding that Congress
lacked authority over the completely internal commerce of a state).
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power to regulate “commerce among the several states.”146  During the nine-
teenth century, Congress rarely exercised this power via explicit legislation.
Gibbons v. Ogden, of course, involved an exception.147  There the Court held
that Congress had employed the commerce power to preempt a New York
statute purporting to grant a monopoly over travel by steamship in New York
waters, even when such vessels carried passengers travelling from one state to
another.148  The Court determined that such interstate travel was “com-
merce,” adopting a definition that seemed to exclude much private business
activity.149  The Court also recognized that, even with respect to such com-
merce, Congress’s power was not unlimited and did not extend to all activi-
ties that constituted “commerce.”  Instead, the Court said, the power only
reached commercial transactions between citizens in two or more states or
intrastate transactions that affected or concerned more than one state.150
Because Gibbons wished to navigate between two or more states, the Court
held that the Act transferred to him “all the right which the grantor [that is,
Congress] can transfer,”151 a right that included the right to conduct trade
between the states.152
Despite the relative absence of affirmative national legislation, there was,
by 1890, a large body of law governing the scope and nature of Congress’s
power over state-imposed regulations of interstate commerce.  Consistent
with dicta from Gibbons, the Court held that certain state-imposed restraints
146 Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
147 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 2.
148 See id. at 211–22 (holding that the federal statute regulating the coasting trade pre-
empted New York’s grant of a monopoly over interstate steam-powered navigation).
149 In particular, the Court defined commerce as “traffic,” in the form of “buying and
selling, or the interchange of commodities” as well as “intercourse” between nations or
states, with the latter including navigation. See id. at 189–90 (“The counsel for the appellee
would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities, and do
not admit that it comprehends navigation.  This would restrict a general term, applicable
to many objects, to one of its significations.  Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is
something more: it is intercourse.  It describes the commercial intercourse between
nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for
carrying on that intercourse.  The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating com-
merce between nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, which shall be
silent on the admission of the vessels of the one nation into the ports of the other, and be
confined to prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals, in the actual employment of
buying and selling, or of barter.”).  This definition, of course, excluded manufacturing,
mining, and agriculture, as the Court would later and repeatedly hold. See, e.g., Kidd v.
Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888).
150 See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194 (“It is not intended to say that these words
comprehend that commerce, which is completely internal, which is carried on between
man and man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and which does not
extend to or affect other States.  Such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly
unnecessary.”).
151 Id. at 213–14.
152 See id.
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were preempted even in the absence of affirmative congressional action.153
Thus, where a subject related to interstate commerce was “inherently
national” or by its nature required a uniform system of regulation, the Court
reasoned that congressional silence with respect to the subject evinced the
national legislature’s intent and purpose that commerce remain “free and
untrammelled,”154 with the result that state regulation of such subjects was
invalid.155  This category consisted of “that portion of commerce with foreign
countries or between the States which consists in the transportation,
purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities.”156  Examples of such
improper state action included state regulation of interstate railroad rates
and differential state taxation of goods because of their out-of-state origin.157
According to the Court, this body of law protected interstate markets from
“invidious,” “partial,” or “discriminating” legislation of the sort that had
afflicted the nation under the Articles of Confederation, given states’ subop-
timal incentives to regulate activities that produced significant interstate spil-
lovers.158  Achievement of these purposes, the Court said, required it to read
153 See id. at 163; id. at 227 (Johnson, J., concurring) (concluding that the authority to
regulate interstate commerce “must be exclusive; it can reside but in one potentate; and
hence, the grant of this power carries with it the whole subject, leaving nothing for the
State to act upon”).
154 Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 282 (1876) (holding that silence by Congress estab-
lished that interstate commerce that the state attempted to tax should be “free and
untrammelled” instead); see also Cty. of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691, 697 (1881) (“Here
there can of necessity be only one system or plan of regulations, and that Congress alone
can prescribe.  Its non-action in such cases with respect to any particular commodity or
mode of transportation is a declaration of its purpose that the commerce in that commod-
ity or by that means of transportation shall be free.”).
155 See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of the Port of Phila., 53 U.S. 299 (1851); see also Barry
Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089,
1101–07 (2000).  Where, on the other hand, the subject in question was susceptible of
various possible solutions drawing upon unique knowledge of local conditions, states were
free to regulate, subject to Congress’s authority to preempt such regulation. See id. at
1108–20 (synthesizing the caselaw articulating and applying this standard).
156 Kimball, 102 U.S. at 697; see also Cushman, supra note 155, at 1101–07.
157 See Robbins v. Shelby Cty. Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 498 (1887) (invalidating a
state tax imposed on dealers representing out-of-state manufacturers of paper goods);
Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886) (voiding a state regulation
of interstate railroad rates); Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344 (1881) (invalidating a tax on
the occupation of importing and reselling goods from other states); Welton, 91 U.S. at 282
(voiding a tax on dealers of goods manufactured in other states); see also Brown v. Mary-
land, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445 (1827); Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and Market-
ing Structure of the Large Corporation, 1875–1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631 (1978) (describing
these developments in Commerce Clause jurisprudence from the mid- to late nineteenth
century).
158 See, e.g., Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 440 (1880) (“But State legislation such as
that indicated in the cases which have been cited, if maintained by this court, would ulti-
mately bring our commerce to that ‘oppressed and degraded state,’ existing at the adop-
tion of the present Constitution, when the helpless, inadequate Confederation was
abandoned and a national government instituted, with full power over the entire subject of
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congressional powers, including the commerce power, so as to “keep pace
with the progress of the country, and adapt themselves to the new develop-
ments of time and circumstances.”159
Importantly, the resulting caselaw did not preempt any and all state
enactments that affected interstate commerce.160  Instead, the Court recog-
nized that various state enactments can affect interstate commerce without
constituting a regulation of it in a constitutional sense.161  State enactments
only constituted impermissible legislation and thus regulated commerce “in
the constitutional sense” if they “impose[d] a direct burden upon interstate
commerce” or “interfere[d] directly with its freedom.”162  By contrast, state
legislation imposing so-called “indirect” impacts or burdens on interstate
commerce was entirely permissible, as Congress possessed no authority over
legislation producing such incidental effects.163  As a result, congressional
silence could not evince an intent to preempt such state enactments.  Legisla-
tion producing “indirect” impacts on interstate commerce beyond the reach
of Congress included bans on manufacturing, even if the resulting products
were destined for export,164 regulation of rates charged for the storage of
commerce, except that wholly internal to the States composing the Union.”); State Ton-
nage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 214 (1871) (“Prior to the adoption of the Constitu-
tion the States attempted to regulate commerce, and they also levied duties on imports and
exports and duties of tonnage, and it was the embarrassments growing out of such regula-
tions and conflicting obligations which mainly led to the abandonment of the Confedera-
tion and to the more perfect union under the present Constitution.”); see also Wabash, 118
U.S. at 577 (concluding that Congress had exclusive constitutional authority over interstate
railway rates because its “enlarged view of the interests of all the States, and of the railroads
concerned, better fits it to establish just and equitable rules”).
159 Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co. 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1878) (“The powers thus
granted are not confined to the instrumentalities of commerce, or the postal service
known or in use when the Constitution was adopted, but they keep pace with the progress
of the country, and adapt themselves to the new developments of time and circum-
stances.”); see also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 70 (1911) (invoking
the test for determining whether a challenged statute imposes a direct effect on interstate
commerce as an example of fact-intensive analysis consistent with the proper judicial role).
160 Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824) (holding that the com-
merce power did not reach intrastate transactions that did not affect more than one state).
161 Cf. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 23 (1888); see also Cushman, supra note 155, at
1108–26.
162 Kidd, 128 U.S. at 20, 23 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“‘As has been often
said, “legislation [by a State] may in a great variety of ways affect commerce and persons
engaged in it without constituting a regulation of it within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion,”’ unless, under the guise of police regulations, it ‘imposes a direct burden upon interstate
commerce,’ or ‘interferes directly with its freedom.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Hall v. DeCuir,
95 U.S. 485, 487, 488 (1878))); see also Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 102 (1876) (explain-
ing that the dormant Commerce Clause only preempted those state laws that “operated
directly upon [interstate] commerce”); id. at 103 (explaining that, in prior decisions invali-
dating state laws, “the legislation created, in the way of tax, license, or condition, a direct
burden upon commerce, or in some way directly interfered with its freedom”).
163 See Kidd, 128 U.S. at 24.
164 Id. at 8–9.
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grain, even though most such grain was destined for export,165 and general
legislation imposing tort liability for negligence.166  The result, the Court
said, was a unified national market.  As one leading historian has put it, these
decisions reflected the Court’s status as umpire of the nation’s “free trade
network.”167  In this way, the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence
encouraged a competitive allocation of resources and prevented states from
employing protectionist policies to exploit consumers.168
This caselaw generated “practical lines”—not fixed rules—distinguishing
between state legislation that Congress implicitly preempted and that which
exceeded the scope of Congress’s power.169  Put another way, this portion of
the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence entailed a flexible standard, not
“arbitrary rules.”170  According to these precedents, Congress possessed ple-
165 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134–35 (1876) (holding that a regulation of prices
charged for storing grain exceeded the scope of the commerce power and thus survived
“even though in so doing [the regulation] may indirectly operate upon commerce outside
its immediate jurisdiction”); id. at 135 (“Their regulation is a thing of domestic concern,
and, certainly, until Congress acts in reference to their inter-state relations, the State may
exercise all the powers of government over them.”).
166 See Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 473 (1888) (“There are many cases, however,
where the acknowledged powers of a State may be exerted and applied in such a manner
as to affect foreign or interstate commerce without being intended to operate as commer-
cial regulations.”); Sherlock, 93 U.S. at 103 (“General legislation of this kind, prescribing the
liabilities or duties of citizens of a State, without distinction as to pursuit or calling, is not
open to any valid objection because it may affect persons engaged in foreign or inter-State
commerce.”).
167 See McCurdy, supra note 157, at 648 (“The Supreme Court’s commerce clause deci-
sions of the 1875–1890 period were of immediate importance to large-scale manufacturers
and had an enduring influence on American economic growth, for they firmly established
the Supreme Court’s role as the umpire of the nation’s free-trade network.”); id. (conclud-
ing that, during the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court established itself “to mon-
itor the free-trade unit in the silence of Congress”); see also Cushman, supra note 155, at
1107 (“The Court’s use of the dormant Commerce Clause to vitiate such parochial legisla-
tion played a critical, instrumental role in opening a national market.”).
168 See Alan J. Meese, Competition Policy and the Great Depression: Lessons Learned and a New
Way Forward, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 255, 267–70 (2013) (explaining how the
Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence during this era helped ensure “a competitive allo-
cation of resources”); see also Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566, 574 (1878) (opining that
the framers adopted the Commerce Clause to ensure “the freest interchange of commodi-
ties among the people of the different states”).
169 See Cushman, supra note 155, at 1110; id. at 1113–14 (“The ‘practical lines’ to be
drawn in order to prevent the dormant Commerce Clause from prohibiting all state regula-
tion were the distinctions between the ‘local’ and the ‘national,’ and between ‘direct’ and
‘indirect’ effects.” (quoting Diamond Glue Co. v U.S. Glue Co., 187 U.S. 611, 616 (1903)
(Holmes, J.))); see also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911)
(explaining that the determination whether a state law “directly” or “indirectly” burdened
commerce was fact-intensive and analogous to application of the “standard of reason” the
Court read into the Act).
170 See Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 571 (1886) (“The line
which separates the powers of the states from this exclusive power of congress is not always
distinctly marked, and oftentimes it is not easy to determine on which side a particular case
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nary authority over conduct or legislation that directly burdened or
obstructed interstate commerce but no authority over conduct that merely
restrained such conduct indirectly.  Moreover, regardless of whether Con-
gress acted, courts imputed to Congress an intent to preempt state legislation
that directly obstructed or directly burdened interstate commerce.171
Perhaps most importantly for this analysis, these doctrinal concepts pro-
duced terms of art that courts invoked when implementing this Commerce
Clause jurisprudence.  The term “commerce,” for instance, conveyed a par-
ticular definition that plainly (to the Court anyway) excluded and included
particular activities.172  Ditto for “burden,” “obstruct,” “direct,” “indirect,”
and “incidental.”173  Moreover, and most importantly, major cases employed
the term “restrain” or “restraint” as synonyms for the term “regulate” or “reg-
ulation” and thus employed the term “restrain” to refer to state legislation
that directly burdened or obstructed interstate commerce and thus did not
survive implied preemption under the dormant Commerce Clause.  In Brown
v. Houston, for instance, the Court opined that a state law that taxed “every
wagon load, or car load of produce and merchandise brought into [a] city”
from other states would be “a regulation of, and restraint upon inter-State com-
merce, so far as the tax should be imposed on articles brought from other
States” and thus “an encroachment upon the exclusive powers of Con-
gress.”174  Moreover, in Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Co. v. Illinois, the
Court opined that “the right of continuous transportation from one end of
the country to the other is essential . . . to . . . freedom of commerce” and
belongs. . . . Under such circumstances, it would be a useless task to undertake to fix an arbitrary
rule by which the line must, in all cases, be located.  It is far better to leave a matter of such delicacy to
be settled in each case upon a view of the paricular rights involved . . . .” (emphasis added)
(quoting Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 487, 488 (1878))); see also Minnesota v. Barber, 136
U.S. 313, 322 (1890) (invalidating a state meat inspection regime despite its facial neutral-
ity and plausible police power purpose, after a fact-intensive determination that the
regime’s “necessary operation . . . directly tends to restrict the slaughtering of animals
whose meat is to be sold in Minnesota for human food to those engaged in such business
in that state.”).
171 To be sure, some private restraints of interstate commerce were unenforceable
according to the common law that federal courts applied when entertaining contract cases
arising under the diversity jurisdiction.
172 See, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20 (1888) (“No distinction is more popular to
the common mind, or more clearly expressed in economic and political literature, than
that between manufactures and commerce.  Manufacture is transformation—the fashion-
ing of raw materials into a change of form for use.  The functions of commerce are differ-
ent.  The buying and selling and the transportation incidental thereto constitute
commerce.”).
173 See, e.g., id. at 23 (“‘[L]egislation [by a State] may in a great variety of ways affect
commerce and persons engaged in it, without constituting a regulation of it within the
meaning of the Constitution,’ unless, under the guise of police regulations, it ‘imposes a
direct burden upon interstate commerce,’ or ‘interferes directly with its freedom.’” (sec-
ond alteration in original) (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hall v.
DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485, 487, 488 (1878))).
174 Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, 634 (1885) (emphasis added).
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that the “commerce clause was intended to secure” this right from “restraints
which the State might choose to impose upon it.”175  The state of Illinois’s
regulation of interstate railway rates, the Court said, constituted just such a
restraint and was void.176  During the same term, in Walling v. Michigan, the
Court employed a similar formulation, holding that a state’s
discriminating tax . . . operating to the disadvantage of the products of other
States . . . is, in effect, a regulation in restraint of commerce among the States, and
as such is a usurpation of the power conferred by the Constitution upon the
Congress of the United States.177
These opinions were not the first to characterize improper state interference
with interstate commerce as “restraints” thereof.  Concurring in Gibbons v.
Ogden, Justice Johnson opined that the “one object riding over every other in
the adoption of the constitution . . . was to keep the commercial intercourse
among the States free from all invidious and partial restraints.”178  Subse-
quent decisions would cite Justice Johnson’s opinion as authority for the pro-
position that congressional authority over subjects that required uniform
national regulation was exclusive.179  Finally, it should be noted that both
Joseph Story and James Monroe employed the term “restraint” to refer to
protectionist measures employed by the states under the Articles of
Confederation.180
Thus, when Congress deliberated over the Sherman Act, it did so against
the background of an extensive body of caselaw that delineated the scope
and limits of Congress’s power.  That caselaw employed the phrase “in
restraint of commerce among the states” to refer to state legislation that
175 Wabash, 118 at 572–73 (emphasis added); see also Bowman v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 125
U.S. 465, 494 (1888) (quoting this language from Wabash with approval).
176 See Wabash, 118 U.S. at 577.
177 Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 455 (1886) (emphasis added).
178 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 231 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
179 The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283, 395 (1849) (McLean, J., concurring) (quoting
Justice Johnson’s opinion for the proposition that Congress possesses exclusive power to
regulate interstate commerce).
180 See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 11
(Melville M. Bigelow ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 5th ed. 1891) (“The experience of
the American States during the confederation abundantly establishes that such arrange-
ments could be, and would be made under the stimulating influence of local interests, and
the desire of undue gain.  Instead of acting as a nation in regard to foreign powers, the
States individually commenced a system of restraint upon each other, whereby the interests
of foreign powers were promoted at their expense.  When one State imposed high duties
on the goods or vessels of a foreign power to countervail the regulations of such powers,
the next adjoining States imposed lighter duties to invite those articles into their port, that
they might be transferred thence into the other States, securing the duties to themselves.
This contracted policy in some of the States was soon counteracted by others.  Restraints
were immediately laid on such commerce by the suffering States; and thus a state of affairs
disorderly and unnatural grew up, the necessary tendency of which was to destroy the
Union itself.” (footnotes omitted)); James Monroe, Special Message to the House of Repre-
sentatives Containing the Views of the President of the United States on the Subject of
Internal Improvements (May 4, 1822) (same).
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improperly “regulated” interstate commerce because it imposed a “direct
burden” on such commerce.  The term “direct burden,” in turn, referred not
to a set of fixed rules, but instead to a standard that courts would apply on a
case-by-case basis.181
The same Court imputed to Congress a will to invalidate such (state-
imposed) restraints.  The resulting regime, however, left private restraints
that might produce the very same effects entirely unscathed.  The Sherman
Act, of course, filled this gap, banning (private) contracts and combinations
that, like preempted state legislation, imposed “restraints” on commerce
among the several states.  Thus, the rich body of law policing the boundaries
between state-imposed “direct” and “indirect” obstructions or restraints of
interstate commerce—and thus encouraging free trade and a competitive
allocation of resources—provides an alternative source of meaning for the
term “restraint of trade.”182
Of course, these precedents provide only a potential source of meaning,
thereby begging some method of choosing between this source and the com-
mon law.  A little consideration, however, suggests that the constitutional
precedents should have priority.  After all, such precedents placed significant
limits on the scope of congressional power, limits that would seem to pre-
clude wholesale incorporation of the common law into section 1 of the Act.
Consider in this respect a classic agreement governed by the common law,
namely, an employee’s agreement with an initial employer not to work for a
competing employer after leaving initial employment.183  If overbroad, such
an agreement could certainly be “in restraint of trade” and thus unenforce-
able at common law.184  Moreover, such an agreement could hypothetically
affect interstate commerce in some way.  However, it is difficult to see how
such an agreement could “directly burden” or “directly obstruct” such com-
merce that consisted of (1) buying and selling across state lines and (2)
travelling from one state to another.185  At the least, any such effect would
surely be “indirect” or incidental in the same way that banning an entire
181 Indeed, in Standard Oil, the Court analogized the “direct burden” test to the “stan-
dard of reason” it announced to implement section 1. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 70 (1911) (likening application of the “standard of reason” to
“the power which must be exercised in every case where the courts are called upon to
determine whether particular acts are invalid which are, abstractly speaking, in and of
themselves valid, but which are asserted to be invalid because of their direct effect upon
interstate commerce”).
182 See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687,
717–18 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (invoking pre-statutory interpretations of a statutory
term of art as establishing the meaning of the contested term); Moskal v. United States,
498 U.S. 103, 121–26 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same).
183 See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft,
J.) (describing this as one of five classic ancillary restraints).
184 Id. at 282–83 (stating that at common law “if the restraint exceeds the necessity
presented by the main purpose of the contract, it is void”).
185 See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text.
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industry would be indirect, even if the industry exported most of its products
to other states.186
Or, consider the classic example of the covenant ancillary to the sale of a
business, say, a bakery.187  The sale itself, of course, while perhaps com-
merce, would not cross state lines, even if the business in question exported
some or all of its output to other states.  To be sure, the agreement not to
compete, that is, not to set up a new establishment that made the same prod-
uct, could affect interstate commerce, at least if the new establishment would
itself have exported its product to other states by transacting with parties in
other states.188  Here again, however, any such effect would be subordinate
to the main transaction—the sale of the business—and thus indirect or inci-
dental.189  Finally, consider the formation of a partnership and accompany-
ing covenant that requires a partner to give up any other ownership interests
and devote his or her complete efforts to the venture, that is, refrain from
“moonlighting” in competition with the venture.190  One suspects that, dur-
ing the 1880s, the vast majority of such agreements governed purely intra-
state operations, such as a small law firm operating in a single city.
Nonetheless, one can imagine a partnership that engaged in interstate com-
merce, say, a partnership that owned steamships that carried passengers
across state lines.191  Agreements by partners not to compete with such ven-
tures would, therefore, prevent rivalry that would otherwise take place.
Still, any such impact on interstate commerce would likely be indirect.
After all, such covenants would simply implement the underlying partner-
ship.  While the creation of the venture could itself reduce competition, any
such reduction was, according to William Howard Taft, “only an incident to
the main purpose of a union of their capital, enterprise, and energy to carry
on a successful business, and one useful to the community.”192  Restraints
preventing partners from moonlighting in competition with the venture
ensured that the partners devoted their entire effort to the venture, enhanc-
ing the efficiency of the business, and were thus merely “ancillary” to the
underlying venture.193  Thus, it would seem, any resulting impact on inter-
state commerce would be “incidental” or “indirect.”
186 See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 15 (1888) (finding that Iowa’s ban on the manufac-
ture of alcohol, even for export, did not directly restrain commerce among the states).
187 See Mitchel v. Reynolds (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347; 1 P. WMS. 181 (Eng.).
188 If, however, the new establishment simply sold its output to a distributor in the same
state, who in turn resold the product to purchasers in other states, the new establishment
would not be participating in interstate commerce but would instead fall into the category
of “manufacturing.”
189 See Ancillary, WEBSTER’S COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra
note 113, at 51 (defining “ancillary” as “subordinate to”).
190 See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 281.
191 Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
192 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 280 (emphasis added).
193 Id. (“Restrictions in the articles of partnership upon the business activity of the
members, with a view of securing their entire effort in the common enterprise, were, of
course, only ancillary to the main end of the union, and were to be encouraged.”).
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The fact that the various restraints mentioned above would likely exceed
the commerce power has important implications for the choice between the
common law and Commerce Clause precedents as a source of statutory
meaning.  That is, to invoke the botanical metaphor that Justice Scalia bor-
rowed from Justice Frankfurter in Moskal v. United States, the scope of con-
gressional power over private commercial activity, even if exercised to its
fullest extent, provided improper soil for transplantation of the common law
governing contracts in restraint of trade under the aegis of the commerce
power.194  Many if not most such contracts, even those involving interstate
commerce, would simply fall outside the scope of the commerce power as
courts understood it, thereby rendering the common law governing contracts
in restraint of trade an inapt source of meaning for section 1.
One need not speculate about how nineteenth-century jurists might
choose between these different sources of meaning, that is, common law and
the Commerce Clause.  In United States v. E.C. Knight Co., for instance, the
Court held that a merger creating a monopoly over the nation’s sugar pro-
duction did not violate the Sherman Act, even though most such sugar was
exported across state lines and thus, after production, became the subject of
interstate commerce.195  After reviewing the Court’s caselaw distinguishing
between direct and indirect state-imposed burdens on interstate commerce,
the Court concluded that Congress had adopted the Sherman Act “in the
light of well-settled principles.”196  These principles, the Court said, denied
Congress the power to regulate mergers, which, the Court said, could only
impact commerce among the states “indirectly,” even if such a transaction
resulted in monopoly.197  Moreover, the Court noted that incorporation of
the common law governing contracts and combinations as the Sherman Act
standard governing mergers would result in rules that exceeded Congress’s
power even more than would a ban on monopoly or preemption of a state
manufacturing ban.  That common law, the Court said, banned certain trans-
actions regardless of whether they produced a monopoly, so long as the
resulting agreements or transactions “tend[ ] to that end” by “depriv[ing]
194 See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 121 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[A]s
Justice Frankfurter more poetically put it: ‘[I]f a word is obviously transplanted from
another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings its soil with
it.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Frankfurter, supra note 87, at 537)).
195 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
196 See id. at 16 (“It was in the light of well-settled principles that the act of July 2, 1890,
was framed.  Congress did not attempt thereby to assert the power to deal with monopoly
directly as such . . . .”).
197 Id. (“Contracts, combinations, or conspiracies to control domestic enterprise in
manufacture, agriculture, mining, production in all its forms, or to raise or lower prices or
wages, might unquestionably tend to restrain external as well as domestic trade, but the
restraint would be an indirect result, however inevitable and whatever its extent, and such
result would not necessarily determine the object of the contract, combination, or
conspiracy.”).
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the public of the advantages which flow from free competition.”198  “Slight
reflection,” the Court said, would show that the extension of “national
power” to such transactions whenever they also (indirectly) affected com-
merce among the states would leave comparatively little of business opera-
tions and affairs to state control, thereby confirming that Congress lacked
power over such restraints.199  In short, the Court rejected the common law
as the operative standard governing such transactions because codification of
such standards with respect to such transactions exceeded the scope of Con-
gress’s constitutional authority.
Two years later, in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, the Court
again addressed the interaction of the Sherman Act and the common law.200
There the United States challenged a horizontal cartel among competing
railroads that carried goods and persons across state lines.  The defendants
emphasized that the title of the Sherman Act described the statute as an act
“to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopo-
lies.”201  As a result, they said, the Court should look to the common law to
determine whether a restraint was “unlawful.”202  They also contended that
the statute could not mean what it said and ban “every” “restraint of trade,”
because such an interpretation would create severe financial hardship and
bankruptcy for the railroads.203  This consideration, they said, fortified the
case for reading the Act only to ban those “unreasonable” restraints con-
198 Id. (“Again, all the authorities agree that, in order to vitiate a contract or combina-
tion it is not essential that its result should be a complete monopoly, it is sufficient if it
really tends to that end and to deprive the public of the advantages which flow from free
competition.  Slight reflection will show that if the national power extends to all contracts
and combinations in manufacture, agriculture, mining, and other productive industries,
whose ultimate result may affect external commerce, comparatively little of business opera-
tions and affairs would be left for state control.”).
199 Id.
200 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
201 Id. at 327 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
202 Id. (“We are asked to regard the title of this act as indicative of its purpose to
include only those contracts which were unlawful at common law, but which require the
sanction of a Federal statute in order to be dealt with in a Federal court.  It is said that
when terms which are known to the common law are used in a Federal statute those terms
are to be given the same meaning that they received at common law, and that when the
language of the title is ‘to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and
monopolies,’ it means those restraints and monopolies which the common law regarded as
unlawful, and which were to be prohibited by the Federal statute.”).
203 Id. at 340 (“In other words, we are asked to read into the act by way of judicial
legislation an exception that is not placed there by the lawmaking branch of the Govern-
ment, and this is to be done upon the theory that the impolicy of such legislation is so clear
that it cannot be supposed Congress intended the natural import of the language it used.
This we cannot and ought not to do.  That impolicy is not so clear, nor are the reasons for
the exception so potent as to permit us to interpolate an exception into the language of
the act, and to thus materially alter its meaning and effect.”).
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demned at common law and not those, like the defendants’ association, that
purportedly set reasonable prices.204
The Court rejected this interpretive strategy, holding instead that the
statute itself contained the proper definition of “unlawful” and that the plain
language, and not the common law, controlled.205  Thus, the Court said, the
statute banned all contracts and combinations that restrained trade, regard-
less of whether such agreements were reasonable or enforceable at common
law.206  While the Court acknowledged that this interpretation might result
in a “disaster” for the railroads and undermine the goals of the Act, the pros-
pect of this result was not so obvious as “to permit [the Court] to interpolate
an exception into the language of the act, and to thus materially alter its
meaning and effect.”207  Thus, the Court rejected the common law as a
source of meaning and found that application of the Act to ban the defend-
ants’ price fixing did not produce results sufficiently absurd to require the
Court to depart from what it considered the statute’s plain language.208
204 Id. at 327–28.
205 Id. at 327 (“We are of opinion that the language used in the title refers to and
includes and was intended to include those restraints and monopolies which are made
unlawful in the body of the statute.  It is to the statute itself that resort must be had to learn
the meaning thereof, though a resort to the title here creates no doubt about the meaning
of and does not alter the plain language contained in its text.”).
206 Id. at 334 (“The plaintiffs are, however, under no obligation in order to maintain
this action to show that by the common law all agreements among competing railroad
companies to keep up rates to such as are reasonable were void as in restraint of trade or
commerce.”); id. at 328 (“When, therefore, the body of an act pronounces as illegal every
contract or combination in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, etc.,
the plain and ordinary meaning of such language is not limited to that kind of contract
alone which is in unreasonable restraint of trade, but all contracts are included in such
language, and no exception or limitation can be added without placing in the act that
which has been omitted by Congress.”).
207 Id. at 340 (“That impolicy is not so clear, nor are the reasons for the exception so
potent as to permit us to interpolate an exception into the language of the act, and to thus
materially alter its meaning and effect.  It may be that the policy evidenced by the passage
of the act itself will, if carried out, result in disaster to the roads and in a failure to secure
the advantages sought from such legislation. . . . Large numbers do not agree that the view
taken by defendants is sound or true in substance, and Congress may and very probably did
share in that belief in passing the Act.  The public policy of the Government is to be found
in its statutes . . . .”).
208 By contrast, four dissenting Justices concluded that the term “restraint of trade”
should bear its common-law meaning and thus ban only restraints that set unreasonable
prices. See id. at 353 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Field, Gray, and Shiras, JJ.)
(“Pretermitting the consideration of the title, it cannot be denied that the words ‘restraint
of trade’ used in the act in question had long prior to the adoption of that act been con-
strued as not embracing reasonable contracts.  The well-settled rule is that where technical
words are used in an act, and their meaning has previously been conclusively settled, by
long usage and judicial construction, the use of the words without an indication of an
intention to give them a new significance is an adoption of the generally accepted meaning
affixed to the words at the time the act was passed.”).
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The Court declined to apply the common law again in United States v.
Joint Traffic Ass’n, another challenge to a railroad cartel.209  There the
defendants claimed that the broad “plain language” approach taken by the
Trans-Missouri Freight decision would ban all sorts of “ordinary contracts and
combinations,” including covenants not to compete, mergers, and partner-
ships, and thus abridge liberty of contract.210  Instead of turning to the com-
mon law, the Court responded by holding that the statute only banned those
contracts and combinations “whose direct and immediate effect is a restraint
upon interstate commerce” and did not reach those whose effect was “indi-
rect or incidental only.”211  In so holding the Court invoked Hopkins v. United
States, announced on the same day.212  There the Court unanimously held
that an agreement between members of a cattle exchange on commissions
charged for the sale of livestock shipped from out of state had merely an
indirect impact on interstate commerce and thus exceeded the scope of the
Sherman Act.213  Application of the direct-indirect standard likely would
have produced a different result, the Court said, if the agreement set rates
that were “exorbitant,” in which case the challenged agreement “might have
similar effect as a burden on commerce that a charge upon commerce itself
209 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
210 See id. at 566–68 (“As examples of the kinds of contracts which are rendered illegal
by this construction of the act, the learned counsel suggest all organizations of mechanics
engaged in the same business for the purpose of limiting the number of persons employed
in the business, or of maintaining wages; the formation of a corporation to carry on any
particular line of business by those already engaged therein; a contract of partnership or of
employment between two persons previously engaged in the same line of business; the
appointment by two producers of the same person to sell their goods on commission; the
purchase by one wholesale merchant of the product of two producers; the lease or
purchase by a farmer, manufacturer or merchant of an additional farm, manufactory or
shop; the withdrawal from business of any farmer, merchant or manufacturer; a sale of the
good will of a business with an agreement not to destroy its value by engaging in similar
business; and a covenant in a deed restricting the use of real estate.  It is added that the
effect of most business contracts or combinations is to restrain trade in some degree.”).
211 Id. at 568 (citing Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 592 (1898)).
212 171 U.S. 578.
213 Id. at 595–96 (analogizing members’ commissions to charges for use of the facilities
themselves, and holding that such charges would impact interstate commerce only “indi-
rect[ly] and remote[ly]” unless “exorbitant”); see also id. at 594 (“An agreement may in a
variety of ways affect interstate commerce, just as state legislation may, and yet, like it, be
entirely valid, because the interference produced by the agreement or by the legislation is
not direct.”).
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might have.”214  In such a case, the Court said, “[a] remedy would probably
be forthcoming” under the direct-indirect standard.215
These decisions, holding that the Sherman Act only reaches contracts
and combinations with direct effects on interstate commerce, regardless of
the status of such restraints at common law, constitute contemporaneous
constructions and thus significant evidence of the meaning of the Act.216
Moreover, they also suggest that the term “restraint of trade” was a “stan-
dard,” and not a rule, and one that referred to the tendency of a contract or
combination to interfere with open national markets, thwart the competitive
allocation of resources, and injure consumers.  Indeed, just nine years after
Congress passed the Act, the Supreme Court unanimously characterized the
statute in exactly this way, namely, as banning private agreements that had
the same impact on interstate commerce as state statutes that imposed direct
burdens on such commerce and thus were impermissible regulations of com-
merce among the states.217  States, the Court said, lacked the proper incen-
tives to regulate such agreements, which Congress had banned in an effort to
protect the national market from such self-interested regulation.218  This
rationale implies an economic standard and one that focuses on the sort of
anticonsumer exercise of market power produced by the sort of “partial” and
“discriminatory” legislation that the Commerce Clause empowered Congress
to ban.219  By enacting a ban on (private) “restraint[s] of trade or com-
merce,” then, Congress presumably meant to incorporate the standard con-
tained in the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, namely, the
214 Id. at 595.  The Court would subsequently hold that it would have considered the
agreement in Hopkins a direct restraint if it had produced unreasonable charges. See Swift
& Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 397 (1905); see also BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE
NEW DEAL COURT 145–46 (1998) (“[I]f the result of the combination of commission men
in the Hopkins Case had been to impose exorbitant charges on the passage of the live stock
through the stockyards from one State to another, the case would have been different . . . .
The effect on interstate commerce in such a case would have been direct.” (quoting Staf-
ford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 525 (1922))); id. at 144–48 (concluding that conduct impos-
ing supracompetitive prices on interstate commerce was deemed a “direct” restraint on
such commerce during this period).
215 See Hopkins, 171 U.S. at 596.
216 See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (invoking contempo-
raneous constructions of state constitutional provisions as evidence of the original mean-
ing of the Eighth Amendment).
217 See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 234–35 (1899).
218 Id. at 231–32.
219 This was also the standard that common-law courts applied to combinations, that is,
cartels such as the one condemned in Addyston Pipe. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note
72 (concluding that, before 1890, common-law courts often enforced horizontal price
agreements setting reasonable prices); see also generally Skrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo.
App. 522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1880) (enforcing a horizontal price fixing agreement that set rea-
sonable prices).  This body of law was in fact transplantable to an exercise of the commerce
power vis-a`-vis such direct restraints of interstate commerce.
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distinction between direct and indirect burdens on interstate commerce.220
Like the “common law” described by Justice Scalia in Business Electronics Corp.
v. Sharp Electronics Corp., this standard distinguishes restraints based upon
their economic consequences, banning those that interfere with free trade by
reducing rivalry and exercising market power to the detriment of consum-
ers.221  Application of such a standard, of course, requires courts to evaluate
the impact of challenged restraints in light of evolving economic concep-
tions, reading the statute dynamically so as to faithfully implement the stan-
dard Congress enacted.
220 See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 421–23
(2005) (contending that some statutory texts articulate a level of generality more consis-
tent with a standard than a rule).
221 See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text.  The discernment and application of
such a standard does not, as Farber and McDonnell contend, entail judges “impos[ing]
their own views of public policy, free from constraint.” See Farber & McDonnell, supra note
68, at 650.  Instead, as Standard Oil explained, the standard follows from the judicial duty
“to apply and enforce the public policy embodied in the statute,” 221 U.S. 1, 64 (1911), a
policy discerned by means of ordinary methods of statutory construction.
